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APPARENT FAULT
Aziz Z. Huq∗ & Genevieve Lakier∗∗
Federal substantive criminal law and constitutional remedies might seem to be distinct
bodies of law. But since the closing decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
has demonstrated an increasing unwillingness in both areas to impose either direct or
indirect sanctions on persons who violate the law but whose conduct is not necessarily
indicative of an unlawful or antisocial intent. Instead, the Court has tended to narrow
liability or remedy to instances in which there is evidence that the regulated actor
contravened not just the law on the books but also a social understanding of legality. We
call this supervening criterion for individual criminal or civil liability an apparent fault
requirement. This Article documents the contemporaneous rise of an apparent fault
requirement across two domains of Supreme Court jurisprudence and explores its causes
as well as its effects. We argue that the demand for apparent fault is likely to make some
kinds of coercive regulation less costly even as it imposes an inhibiting tax on other species
of state intervention. Rather than diagnosing apparent fault’s rise as an endogenous
product of legal reasoning, we situate it within a broader historical and intellectual context
as a way of showing the value of understanding doctrine in the context of its sociocultural
moment.

INTRODUCTION

F

ederal substantive criminal law and constitutional remedies at first
blush seem to be distinct bodies of federal law. Both, to be sure,
regulate the circumstances in which a court may impose individualized
penalties or remedies in cases where a federal law or rule has been violated. Both also figure large on the Supreme Court’s docket. Otherwise,
their commonalities seem few and far between. Beyond a handful of
First, Second, and Fourteenth Amendment precedents, the Constitution
stipulates no substantive criminal law.1 Federal legislators are thus free
to fashion a criminal code only occasionally attending to the Constitution.
The availability of remedies for violations of individual constitutional

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗
**

Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law School.
Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law School.
Our thanks to Rabia Belt, Andrew Manuel Crespo, David Fontana, Elizabeth Papp Kamali,
Robin B. Kar, Jason Mazzone, Richard H. McAdams, Justin Murray, John Rappaport, Adam M.
Samaha, Louis Michael Seidman, John F. Stinneford, Suja Thomas, and Laura Weinrib for terrific
conversations and suggestions, which saved us from many errors of fact and judgment. The editors
of the Harvard Law Review gave us terrific feedback and did tremendous editing work. We also
received useful feedback from participants in workshops at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, the University of Chicago, and the University of Pennsylvania. Research on this Article
was partly supported by the Frank J. Ciccone Fund. Our remaining errors are our fault in all
possible senses of that term.
1 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 66 (1997) (noting that among the “aspects of criminal justice that constitutional law has left alone” is “the content of substantive criminal law”).
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rights, by contrast, necessarily impacts how both state and federal governments deploy civil and criminal tools alike.2
Over the past four decades, however, parallel shifts in the Supreme
Court’s substantive criminal law and constitutional remedies cases have
taken place in rough temporal lockstep. In each domain, the Court has
evinced increasing unwillingness to impose either direct or indirect sanctions — a criminal conviction, an award of damages, or a remedial order — on defendants or state actors who violate the law but whose conduct does not necessarily indicate an unlawful or antisocial intent. In a
wide and heterogeneous array of cases, the Court has refused to sanction
these “apparently innocent” actors — so named because their mental
culpability is not apparent from their actions.3 Instead, it has insisted
on quite particular kinds of evidentiary showings that tend to demonstrate, either directly or indirectly, that the defendant or government
official acted with a morally objectionable intent. More specifically, it
has insisted on evidence that allows the Justices to conclude that the
wrongdoer either knew or clearly should have known that his or her
conduct was wrong. The result has been to make what we call “apparent fault” an increasingly important gatekeeper of civil and criminal liability in federal law.
The doctrinal mechanisms the Court has employed to ensure that
litigants suffer consequences when they break the law — or are remediated for the violation of their constitutional rights — only when fault is
in this sense apparent vary from case to case. Sometimes, the Court
operationalizes the apparent fault requirement by reading very demanding mens rea requirements into statutes that do not obviously contain
them. In other cases, it construes statutory actus reus requirements narrowly to ensure that only actions that are impossible to reconcile with
an innocent intent are subject to judicial sanction. In yet other instances, it operationalizes the demand for apparent fault by creating a
good faith exemption to a legal rule. In all these cases, however, the
Court refashions liability rules to ensure that only those who it believes
specifically intended to achieve an unlawful purpose or who violated a
social understanding of legality, and who therefore should have known
that what they did was unlawful, trigger legal consequences for their
acts.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2 By “constitutional remedies,” we mean both “remedies that are available as a matter of constitutional right for the redress of constitutional wrongs,” Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1969), and remedies available by dint of a federal statute.
3 The phrase first appeared in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985), but has been
used quite prolifically since then in the Court’s criminal law cases, see, e.g., Bryan v. United States,
524 U.S. 184, 194–95 (1998) (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144–45 (1994)); United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 71 (1994) (quoting Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426); Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); Ratzlaf, 510
U.S at 155 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426). One of the contributions of this Article is to flesh out what the Court means when it talks about apparent innocence
and (by implication) apparent fault.
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The result has been to make judges’ supervening judgments about
the relevant social understanding of legality an increasingly important
limit on the availability of judicial sanctions. Further, certain kinds of
constitutional and criminal rules — rules for which it is difficult to establish directly that the regulated actor behaved with an unlawful intent, or difficult to show that the wrongfulness of the challenged act was
apparent — are now more costly to enforce. What this means is that
the apparent fault requirement not only limits the availability of constitutional remedies and the application of criminal sanctions but also has
a potentially important distributive effect. It raises or lowers the relative cost of imposing judicial penalties and remedies, thereby acting as
either a tax or a subsidy on state action. By making apparent fault a
predicate to individualized judicial attention, the Court indirectly influences how the federal government (and sometimes state governments)
allocates its coercive resources.
The subtle yet important role that apparent fault plays in the Court’s
criminal and constitutional remedies cases can be glimpsed in two recent
cases. Neither directly focuses on the litigant’s state of mind. Both
nevertheless demonstrate the Court’s unwillingness to impose sanctions
on defendants whose actions are not irreconcilable with an innocent intent — that is, an intent to accomplish ends not prohibited by the social
understanding of legality. As the two cases show, moreover, the Court’s
view of what counts as a social understanding of legality is hardly uncontroversial. Rather, apparent fault rests upon the Justices’ eminently
contestable normative judgments.
Consider first McDonnell v. United States,4 which involved the
criminal prosecution, and successful conviction, of Bob McDonnell, the
former governor of Virginia,5 under a federal statute that made it a
crime for government officials “‘to receive or accept anything of value’
in return for being ‘influenced in the performance of any official act.’”6
The U.S. Attorney argued that McDonnell violated the statute when he
arranged meetings for a local businessman with other government officials in exchange for $175,000 worth of loans and gifts, and a jury
agreed.7 The Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction,8 but the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded9 after finding that McDonnell’s actions,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4
5
6
7
8
9

136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
Id. at 2361.
Id. at 2365 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012)).
Id. at 2361.
Id.; United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 486 (4th Cir. 2015).
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375.
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which included hosting and arranging meetings with other officials,10
did not qualify under the statute as “official act[s].”11
The Court reached this conclusion in part by employing venerable
tools of statutory interpretation such as the canon of noscitur a sociis
and the rule against superfluity.12 A driving concern of its analysis,
however, was the normative concern that the Court claimed would be
raised by a broader interpretation of the law.13 Construing the statute
to prohibit government officials from arranging meetings for constituents in exchange for “things of value,”14 the Court argued, would cast a
“pall of potential prosecution” over actions that “conscientious public
officials [engage in] . . . all the time.”15 It would enable criminal liability,
“without fair notice, for the most prosaic interactions.”16 The Court
therefore interpreted the acts covered by the statute more narrowly than
the lower courts had to avoid imposing liability on actors it viewed as
blameless. It redefined the statutory actus reus requirement, in other
words, in order to avoid rendering liable those who acted in compliance
with what the Court perceived to be a generally accepted norm of official behavior.
The Court’s insistence on apparent fault as a predicate for an individualized judgment can also be discerned in its 6–3 decision the same
Term in Utah v. Strieff.17 This case concerned the application of the
attenuation exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.18
The defendant, charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, argued that evidence of his possession of drugs should be excluded from trial because it was discovered during a search incident to
an arrest that — while itself lawful — occurred only as a result of what
the government conceded to be an unconstitutional stop.19 A majority
of the Supreme Court disagreed.20 Exclusion was unnecessary, it said,
given the lack of evidence of “flagrant” wrongdoing by the police officer.21 Placing great weight on this element of the attenuation test, the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10
11

Id. at 2361.
Id. at 2372 (holding that an official act “must involve a formal exercise of governmental
power . . . similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a
hearing before a committee”).
12 See id. at 2368–72.
13 See id. at 2372–73.
14 Id. at 2365.
15 Id. at 2372.
16 Id. at 2373 (emphasis added).
17 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
18 See id. at 2060.
19 Id.
20 See id. at 2064 (reversing the Utah Supreme Court’s judgment for the defendant, State v.
Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015)).
21 Id. at 2063.
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Court characterized the officer’s initial unlawful stop as “at most negligent” and the product of “good-faith mistakes” — and therefore not the
kind of unlawful action the exclusionary rule was designed to deter.22
Unlike McDonnell, Strieff concerned an individualized legal remedy
for a constitutional violation, rather than the scope of a federal statute:
does this officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment entail a retail
consequence of exclusion? But as in McDonnell, the case’s disposition
did not depend, ultimately, on the Court’s interpretation of the underlying legal norm (here, the Fourth Amendment). Instead, it turned on the
Court’s judgment of whether, and to what extent, the officer’s conduct
violated a widely shared social understanding of what the law required.
By requiring that the officer’s violation of the constitutional rule be a
“flagrant” one, the Court attempted to ensure — just as it attempted to
ensure in McDonnell — that only actors whose conduct clearly violated
the social norms of appropriate behavior, and who therefore betrayed,
at the least, a less-than-conscientious attitude, suffered legal consequences for their bad acts.
McDonnell and Strieff are only the latest in a series of cases in which
the Court’s concern for an apparently innocent actor acting in apparent
compliance with law has influenced its interpretation of federal criminal
law and constitutional remedies. This Article describes and analyzes
this apparent fault frame from doctrinal, institutional, and political
economy perspectives. Our core aim is to isolate a distinctive intellectual move employed by the Justices in otherwise disparate strands of
precedent. Our argument braids different doctrinal strands that often
employ the same terms toward subtly different ends. We employ new
terminology — the neologism of “apparent fault” — to capture a commonality that knits together an otherwise heterogeneous body of cases
and legal doctrines.23
In what follows, we advance three interrelated claims. The first is
descriptive: a demand for apparent fault emerged, at roughly the same
time, in the Court’s criminal law and constitutional remedies cases. This
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
22 Id. Justice Kagan, writing in dissent, sharply disagreed with the majority’s conclusion on
this point (as on others). Id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority chalks up [the officer’s]
Fourth Amendment violation to a couple of innocent ‘mistakes.’ But far from a Barney Fife–type
mishap, [the] seizure . . . was a calculated decision, taken with so little justification that the State
has never tried to defend its legality.” (citation omitted)). The striking disagreement on this point
between the majority and the dissent points to the inevitably contestable nature of judgments about
apparent fault — a point we discuss below.
23 One early contribution to the Critical Race Studies field anticipates some of the themes we
address but is focused on the equal protection doctrine’s turn to a “perpetrator perspective” in the
1970s. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052–57 (1978) (arguing
that equal protection doctrine focused unduly on questions of “fault” and “causation,” id. at 1054,
thus “creat[ing] a class of ‘innocents,’ who need not feel any personal responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination,” id. at 1055).
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claim is distinct from, yet builds on, previous work by one of us on the
arc of constitutional remedies.24 We hope it is also clear by now that
our concept of apparent fault is distinct from the use of the term fault
to connote mens rea in the federal criminal law context, a concept that
has attracted some attention of late.25 True, one of the ways in which
the Court protects innocent defendants from liability is by reading stringent mens rea requirements into statutes that do not obviously contain
them. But this is not the only instrument at its disposal. And our use
of the term “fault” should not be taken as an attempt to draw upon the
criminal law baggage that word commonly implies.
Second, we contend that the Court’s embrace of apparent fault has
complex, cross-cutting effects on the reach of state coercion. Installing
apparent fault as a threshold for criminal liability or remedial relief
shapes the cost profile of the government’s different regulatory tools.
We identify these effects and consider how they might shape the ways
in which federal (and to a lesser extent state) power is deployed against
individuals.
To see the basic intuition here, consider again the two cases discussed
above. McDonnell makes it more difficult for the government to prosecute officials who trade their public power for private gain, whereas
Strieff lowers the cost of street-level narcotics policing by making it
harder for defendants to exclude evidence when police officers violate
their constitutional rights. The likely effect of McDonnell is therefore
to discourage the prosecution of government corruption.26 The likely
effect of Strieff, in contrast, is to encourage police officers to engage in
fishing expeditions to find contraband.27 While the magnitude of these
effects is hard to estimate, we argue that, as a general matter, the demand for apparent fault makes it more difficult to prosecute or otherwise sanction high-status individuals and makes it easier to prosecute
defendants, like Edward Strieff, who tarry in what to the Justices seem
obviously criminal environments.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24 Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE
L.J. 1, 4 (2015) (arguing that “the Court has developed a gatekeeping rule of fault for individualized
constitutional remedies”).
25 Scholarship exploring the Court’s turn to fault as mens rea in its criminal law cases includes
Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea
Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 861 (1999); John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty
by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021,
1023 (1999); and PAUL LARKIN ET AL., HERITAGE FOUND., THE SUPREME COURT ON MENS
REA: 2008–2015 (2016), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the-supreme-court-mens-rea-20082015 [https://perma.cc/5552-WS75].
26 This is assuming that an official is corrupt when he or she trades his or her public power for
private gain, as McDonnell clearly did. See Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption’s Last
Stand, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1619, 1628–29 (2017).
27 This was certainly what Justice Sotomayor argued in dissent. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Our third and final contribution is to explore continuities between
the idea of apparent fault and wider currents in American law and society. To be clear, we offer no simple, causal account of the idea’s emergence. This was a gradual process. It unfolded in slow and nearimperceptible shifts. It involved many judges over time. And it wanted
for an organizing manifesto or focal leader. We eschew reckless assumptions about the rationality and purposiveness of American legal and political development that ascribe intentionality or that discern a simple
functional explanation.28 Instead, we identify parallel sociocultural and
political currents.29 By illuminating continuities between the Court’s
doctrinal innovations and that wider context, we underscore the value
of understanding even recent doctrine not simply as the endogenous
product of judicial reasoning but instead as a product of larger cultural
and ideological shifts.
Some preliminary caveats about the scope of our analysis are necessary. First, our analysis focuses primarily on Supreme Court rulings in
the areas of substantive criminal law and constitutional remedies. We
think the specific intellectual move we describe here is visible in both
bodies of law. Both require courts to decide whether and when to sanction an individual’s violation of federal law. This is not to say that the
Court has not evinced somewhat similar concerns with social understandings of the law in other domains, or sliced up doctrine using quite
different implements.30 They are simply not our topic; we think the
domains we study here are consequential enough to merit their own
treatment. Second, we focus on the distributive effect of the apparent
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
28 For one thing, most kinds of purposive social action have “unanticipated consequences.”
Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV.
894, 894 (1936).
29 The problem of causal attribution in legal history, and in particular the history of different
kinds of liability, is persistently characterized by competing claims of inevitability and contingency.
See John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1 J.
TORT L., no. 2, 2007, at 1, 4. Our claim about historical causality, however, is weaker than
Professor Witt’s claim about tort law. Witt suggests that doctrinal developments can be “both
contingent and inevitable at once — contingent in the sense that they rest on some other, contingent
set of [social or political] arrangements, and inevitable in the sense that once those arrangements
are in place, certain effects follow ineluctably.” Id. at 39. We do not think the emergence of an
apparent fault demand was necessarily “ineluctabl[e]”; we sympathize instead with Professor Robert
Gordon’s now-canonical critique of “evolutionary functionalism.” Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 66 (1984).
30 Indeed, we have separately identified quite different kinds of judicial strategies for calibrating
interventions elsewhere in constitutional doctrine. See Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 234 (flagging the rise of a unifying anticlassificatory principle in First Amendment free speech law); see also
Aziz Z. Huq, Judging Discriminatory Intent, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3033169 [https://perma.cc/5UZU-3XBS] (analyzing the role of intent in
the context of the Religion Clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment); Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of
Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064267
[https://perma.cc/Y264-FHVM] (reviewing JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION:
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017)) (identifying three deep
lines of disagreement in structural constitutional cases).
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fault demand upon the federal government, rather than the states, because its actions are necessarily influenced by the Court’s interpretations
of both federal substantive law and constitutional remedies. Only as an
ancillary matter do we flag the effect of this demand upon state-level
actors such as police, prosecutors, and judges who must reckon with the
possibility of correction through a constitutional tort suit, habeas action,
or motion for exclusion.
Our argument has four steps. Part I lays necessary groundwork,
defining what we mean by apparent fault and relating it to cognate ideas
in criminal law and the law of constitutional remedies. Part II demonstrates how, beginning in the 1960s but accelerating in the 1970s and
1980s, the Court manifested increasing concern, in both its federal criminal law and constitutional remedies cases, with the problem of the “innocent” or faultless defendant. The result was a series of interpretative
and doctrinal moves that can be usefully understood as a symphonic
whole, notwithstanding their distinct formulations and substantive contexts. Part III analyzes the dynamic effects of this development on the
choice between different regulatory strategies and suggests that its differential effects on different populations are, at the margin, likely to
have regressive consequences. Finally, Part IV situates the demand for
apparent fault within a wider social and historical context.
I. FAULT AND APPARENT FAULT DEFINED AND EXPLORED
The idea that liability should attach only to defendants who are in
some sense at fault is an idea with a long and complex history in both
public and private law. Precisely for that reason, however, what jurists
and scholars mean when they speak of fault varies significantly across
and even within legal domains. So our investigation demands some
preliminary clarification of what, precisely, we mean by fault and, more
specifically, by apparent fault.
A. Fault and Apparent Fault Defined
“Fault” is a slippery term. In different contexts, it is used to mean
different things. In ordinary tort law, fault usually refers to an objective
standard of liability. Torts are considered fault based when they require
proof that the defendant violated an objective standard of reasonable
care; they are considered “no-fault” when they don’t.31 In criminal law,
in contrast, fault usually refers to a subjective standard of liability. A
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Innocent Threats, Concealed Consent, and the Necessary
Presence of Strict Liability in Traditional Fault-Based Tort Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 205, 237–38
(2010) (“Much of tort law, and almost all of the traditional doctrines such as the intentional torts,
are considered fundamentally fault-based, requiring some undesirable or antisocial act by a party
in order to justify imposing liability upon them.”).
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defendant is considered “at fault” when he or she acts with mens rea —
usually defined as an evil or morally culpable mental state.32 Even here,
however, there is ambiguity about what it means to say that a defendant
is at fault. Although it is widely understood that strict liability offenses
are offenses that impose criminal sanctions “without proof of fault,”
courts and scholars differ in how they define offenses as strict liability.33
Sometimes the term strict liability is used to refer to an offense that
imposes criminal liability without requiring the prosecution to prove
that the defendant acted with mens rea with respect to any of the elements that make up the crime.34 Alternatively, the term can be used to
refer to an offense that imposes criminal liability without requiring the
prosecution to prove that the defendant acted with mens rea with respect to every one of its elements.35 Sometimes, the term is used to mean
something else entirely.36
We employ the term “apparent fault” to capture a distinct but related
idea that has emerged in the Supreme Court’s docket since the 1970s.
A judicial demand for apparent fault is a demand for a showing that a
person not only violated the law but also violated what the Court perceives to be a social understanding of legality. A person violates a social
understanding of legality when he or she intentionally acts to further
ends he or she either knew or should have known to be unlawful based
on the circumstances in which he or she acted.37 The concept of apparent fault thus encompasses consideration not only of the defendant’s or
government official’s mental state but also of the norms and circumstances in which he or she acted. Hence, the Court reversed Bob
McDonnell’s conviction, and denied a suppression remedy for Edward
Strieff, because it found that the relevant conduct in those cases was not
flagrantly or self-evidently unlawful.38 In reaching these judgments, the
Court did not simply look to the relevant statutory text or constitutional
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 210–11 (1991) (quoting
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952)); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the
Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 147–48.
33 R.A. Duff, Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 125, 125–26 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005).
34 Stuart P. Green, Six Senses of Strict Liability: A Plea for Formalism, in APPRAISING STRICT
LIABILITY, supra note 33, at 1, 2–3.
35 Id. at 3.
36 Id. at 5–9.
37 That is, a social understanding of legality is an understanding held by members of the diffuse
public of what the law requires. This is distinct from the idea of a social norm. See Peter Hedström
& Peter Bearman, What Is Analytical Sociology All About? An Introductory Essay, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY 3, 18 (Peter Hedström & Peter Bearman
eds., 2009) (describing Jon Elster’s definition of social norms as “non-outcome-oriented injunctions
to act or to abstain from acting, sustained by the sanctions that others apply to norm violators”);
see also Jon Elster, Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY, supra,
at 195, 195–215.
38 See supra pp. 1528–30.
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test. Instead, it reached an independent judgment about what would
have been obviously lawful or unlawful to a person in the relevant circumstances. We characterize this understanding as “social,” and not
legal, because it focuses upon shared expectations about what kind of
behavior is licit and what is illicit, rather than on the formal substance
of the law.
So defined, the demand for apparent fault is related to, without being
identical to, the insistence on evidence of mens rea in criminal law cases.
It is related to the doctrine of mens rea insofar as it serves a similar
purpose: to sort more from less morally culpable behavior in order to
better channel the state’s coercive resources. It is distinct from the doctrine of mens rea insofar as it does not necessarily look directly at intentionality and can be, and indeed sometimes must be, satisfied by something other than direct evidence of the defendant’s mental state or even
direct evidence of gross negligence. Instead, it can be satisfied by showing what in McDonnell the Court found had not been demonstrated by
the prosecution: namely, that the defendant acted in a manner that cannot be squared with an innocent — that is, neither unlawful nor antisocial — end. As McDonnell demonstrates, there may be cases in which
the statutory mens rea requirement is satisfied and yet the defendant’s
fault is not apparent. A defendant may, for example, intentionally commit the acts that comprise the offense. But, as in McDonnell, if those
actions are not prohibited by the social understanding of legality, the
defendant cannot be presumed to have known or to have been expected
to know that what he or she did was wrong. This explains, as we detail
below, the Court’s insistence in certain of its criminal law cases on evidence that the defendant not only acted intentionally but also committed
those acts knowing that they were forbidden by law.39
Apparent fault is thus a general, relatively abstract concept that can
be demonstrated by indicia purely external to the individual, by evidence of the individual’s state of mind, or by a mix of both. It is also a
concept whose application can be highly contested. This is because it
relies upon an ultimately contestable judgment by judges about what
the social understandings of legality in fact are.40 To be clear, our claim
is not that the Court always uses the term “fault” to refer to its demand
that wrongdoing be shown to be the product of bad intent before it can
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39
40

See infra section II.B, pp. 1556-64.
Professor Paul Robinson has diagnosed a “puzzling deference to lay intuitions of justice” in
the instrumentalist approach to modern criminal codes. Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal
Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2000). Our claim is distinct from, and at odds with, Robinson’s in the sense
that we observe the Supreme Court applying a supervening judgment about something akin to
Robinson’s “lay intuitions of justice,” id. at 1839, and modifying the scope of liability. Our claim
also extends beyond federal criminal law to constitutional remedies.
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trigger legal consequences. Rather, the Court’s terminology in the cases
is varied and inconstant. It is we who use the term to identify commonalities between the constitutional and criminal law cases that have been
implicit rather than explicit. Still, as we show, a surprisingly significant
swath of modern criminal and constitutional remedies doctrine can be
understood in terms of a concern with apparent fault.
But perhaps our definition is too capacious, raising questions of
what, if anything, falls beyond it. Quite a lot. The apparent fault demand excludes forms of liability that do not require either direct or indirect evidence of an unlawful or antisocial intent.41 For example, a
theory of criminal or constitutional liability that asked only whether “the
[individual] . . . committed the act proscribed by the statute” (or constitutional provision) would not be apparent fault based.42 A liability
standard that asked only whether the wrongdoing was unreasonable
would also not be fault based, in the sense that we use the term. Nor
would a legal standard that required only that the defendant satisfy the
statutory mens rea requirements, whatever they may be. Apparent fault
is also uncorrelated to an objective, welfarist threshold. There is no
reason to assume that liability based on apparent fault will track the
cost-justified level of liability in either the criminal or civil contexts, or
that it will generate the necessary incentives for efficient precaution taking. Indeed, as we argue below, there is good reason to believe that a
liability standard based on fault will not generate such incentives — at
least not across the board.
B. Historical Conceptions of Fault
in Criminal, Tort, and Constitutional Law
While the demand for apparent fault is new, earlier law is haunted
with precursors and partial parallels. It is a truism of criminal law, for
example, that there may be no punishment without evidence of
subjective fault, or what Blackstone famously called a “vicious will.”43
In practice, however, a notion of subjective fault has played an unstable
and volatile role in the historical march of the criminal law. Fault has
played even less of a role in the law of constitutional remedies.
1. Forms of Fault in Tort and Constitutional Remedies. — For much
of American history, government liability for constitutional wrongs was
secured using the mechanisms of ordinary tort law and the associated
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 205 n.2 (1973)
(“The concept of strict liability . . . at its core is the notion that one who injures another should be
held liable whether or not the injurer was negligent or otherwise at fault.”).
42 Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 733
(1960); see also James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908) (explaining that
strict liability simply asks whether the defendant did “the physical act which damaged the plaintiff”).
43 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.
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writ system.44 Ordinary tort law continues to exercise a gravitational
pull upon the contours of constitutional liability today.45 Doctrinal tests
that are used to determine when constitutional remedies are available
tend to involve a determination of the reasonableness of the government
official’s behavior, picking up on one central tenet of ordinary tort law.46
This is not to say that proof of fault of some sort was always a prerequisite to recovery in tort law. To the contrary, from the nineteenth
century onward, courts allowed defendants to be held civilly liable for
certain torts absent a showing of either subjective culpability or negligence.47 Before the Civil War, “negligence serv[ed] as the primary but
by no means the exclusive liability standard.”48 It was also true after
the Civil War, when the rapid pace of industrialization catalyzed the
development of a diverse range of litigation-based and insurance-based
responses to the growing tally of workplace accidents.49 Many of these
responses rejected any requirement that wrongdoing, either subjective
or objective, be demonstrated in order to collect either a damage award
or an insurance payment.50 More recently, but for similar reasons, late
twentieth-century tort law saw increasing use of this kind of strict liability in the products liability context.51
Evidence of fault was also not traditionally a prerequisite in suits
against government officials. In fact, courts paid almost no attention in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44 Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed,
and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 150 (2012) (“[T]he common law system of
remedies . . . [was] long assumed to be the vehicle by which the Constitution would be enforced.”).
45 For example, in analyzing the availability of constitutional remedies for a wrongful conviction
and for certain Fourth Amendment claims, the Court has expressly and repeatedly drawn on the
common law tort of malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920–
21 (2017) (holding that common law principles guide, but do not control, § 1983 claims); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489–90 (1994) (drawing on the common law of malicious prosecution to
define the availability of postconviction review under habeas).
46 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860, at 85–101 (1977).
47 See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730–33 (1981) (discussing New Hampshire and California
case law).
48 Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 644
(1989).
49 John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and
the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 708 (2001) (“The United
States and other industrializing nations experimented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries with an array of policy alternatives to address the problem of compensation for accident
victims . . . .”).
50 See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation,
15 GA. L. REV. 925, 947 (1981).
51 See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461–65 (1985) (chronicling the
evolution of strict liability products liability law in the last century). As early as 1929, then-Professor
William Douglas had argued for liability premised on a least cost avoider principle. William O.
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 587–88 (1929).

1538

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:1525

such cases to the question of whether the official acted reasonably or,
for that matter, with good intent. Under English law, suit by petition of
right against the Crown was used to secure restitution of lands and
goods, as well as money damages for wrongful detentions and contract
violations.52 Officers, by contrast, could be sued at common law without the Crown’s consent (although the monarch could step in and claim
an act as his or her own, thus insulating the official from tort liability).53
Early American law discarded the petition of right as a mechanism for
legal accountability54 but permitted common law actions against officers
“regardless of [their] good faith and caution and the best of intentions.”55
Several influential early decisions of the Supreme Court, such as Little
v. Barreme56 and Osborn v. Bank of the United States,57 exemplify this
use of common law actions to redress unlawful governmental action
without any showing of fault.58 Into the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court continued to characterize officer suits as matters “sounding in
tort”59 that lay “between the individual plaintiff and the individual defendant” such that no sovereign immunity obtained.60
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
52 Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1924); see also Louis
L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5
(1963).
53 Jaffe, supra note 52, at 9. Perhaps the best-known example is Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.), which played a pivotal role in motivating the Fourth Amendment’s proposal
and ratification. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 563 nn.21–22 (1999).
54 Jaffe, supra note 52, at 19.
55 David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 17 (1972); see also id. at 47. Professor Louis Jaffe briefly mentions the availability
of good faith immunity in the nineteenth-century case law. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 220–21 (1963). But he immediately
qualifies this by saying that officers remained liable for “negligence in the course of [their] official
duty.” Id. at 222.
56 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
57 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see also Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) (damages for trespass
by military officials under orders from a United States Attorney); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
331 (1806) (damages for trespass by government official).
58 See Jaffe, supra note 52, at 21–23 (discussing Osborn); see also Richard A. Matasar, Personal
Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court’s Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV.
741, 760 (1987) (“Under principles of agency law well-accepted by the late 1860’s and early 1870’s,
governmental agents were held responsible in damage suits for their negligent acts, misfeasances in
offices, and intentional wrongs.”). The question of constitutionality would arise if and when an
officer raised a defense of valid legal authority. Hill, supra note 2, at 1123 (“[An] officer acting
under a void statute, or outside the bounds of a valid statute, may be regarded as stripped of his [or
her] official character, and answerable, like any private citizen, for conduct which, when attributable to a private citizen, would be an offense against person or property.”).
59 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 686 (1949); accord Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 518–19 (1893); Cunningham v.
Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 452 (1883).
60 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 152 (1900) (allowing recovery of property from a federal
officer); accord Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 223 (1897).
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Forms of official immunity started to emerge in the mid-nineteenth
century.61 In 1840, the Supreme Court began to deny injunctive remedies such as mandamus where the challenged government action was
“discretionary” rather than mandatory.62 Five years later, a damages
award was denied on the same ground.63 Although this discretion model
of officer liability limited the availability of remedies, it focused on the
nature of the official power in question rather than the intentions of the
government actor. Hence, it should be understood as an alternative to
an apparent fault rule, not its precursor.64 Indeed, the Court rejected a
good faith exception to liability in the 1915 case of Myers v. Anderson.65
Only in 1949 did the paradigm begin to change with Judge Learned
Hand’s decision in Gregoire v. Biddle,66 and a new theory of official
immunity from liability entered the law — a framework that, in time,
would evolve into a demand for evidence of fault.67
2. Forms of Fault in Criminal Law. — Fault played more of a role
in the criminal law. Indeed, from the eighteenth century onward, judges
and commentators alike insisted that it was a fundamental principle of
justice that, in order for there to be criminal punishment, the defendant
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
61
62

See Kian, supra note 44, at 153.
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 509 (1840); see also Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483,
499 (1896) (applying the discretion model and noting that allegations of bad intent could not be
employed to oust discretionary immunity); Jaffe, supra note 55, at 218–19 (explaining discretionary
immunity). Although the distinction between mandatory and discretionary acts was invoked in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–67 (1803), it was not the basis for the Court’s
refusal to issue a writ of mandamus in the case; it developed later. Id. at 176–77 (denying relief on
the grounds that the statute that authorized individuals like William Marbury to petition the
Supreme Court for writs of mandamus was in violation of the constitutional limits imposed on the
Court’s original jurisdiction). Unlike federal officials, state officials did not benefit from the doctrine of discretionary immunity. See, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (permitting damages
action against officials who had denied plaintiffs the right to vote); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927) (same); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897) (similar for action that violated the dormant
commerce clause). Hence, the main text concerns only suits against national officers.
63 Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 97–98 (1845).
64 As the Court explained in Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136 (1870), the officer’s
“mistake as to his [or her] duty and honest intentions will not excuse the offender.” Id. at 138; see
also id. (“The rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done
by a public officer, and he [or she] neglects or refuses to do such act, he [or she] may be compelled
to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his [or her] conduct.”).
65 238 U.S. 368, 378–79 (1915) (rejecting an argument that “malice,” id. at 371, was required for
liability in a suit alleging racial discrimination in election administration in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
66 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
67 See Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1125
(1981) (identifying Gregoire as beginning “the breakdown” of the “established” system of liabilities);
Engdahl, supra note 55, at 41 (noting the novelty of immunity doctrines that have been expanded
“beyond their traditional scope”); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 462–63, 463 n.368 (1987) (situating Gregoire in the larger
context of the Supreme Court’s efforts to reconcile the discretionary and legality models of official
immunity).

1540

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:1525

must be shown to have possessed what Blackstone described as a “vicious will” or what courts generally glossed as mens rea.68 The idea that
the criminal law punished only those who were subjectively at fault
served, in other words, as an important ideal of justice.
Yet in practice the role that mens rea played in the operation of criminal justice was far more nuanced and complex. For one thing, mens
rea was not inevitably a prerequisite to conviction. Although the idea
that criminal culpability generally requires proof of mens rea appeared
in legal writings dating back to the twelfth century,69 early modern jurists recognized the existence of some serious crimes that did not require
it. In his 1644 Institutes, for example, Edward Coke approvingly discussed examples of murder in which mens rea was lacking.70
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, legislatures across the
United States created many more such offenses in response to what were
perceived to be the ramifying moral as well as physical harms of industrialization.71 The result was what some observers characterized as an
explosion in the number of strict liability crimes.72 Many of these crimes

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
68 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895) (“No one . . . would wish either the
courts or juries . . . to disregard the humane principle, existing at common law . . . that to constitute
a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act
consequent upon such vicious will.” (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *21)); JOHN
HOLMES, THE STATESMAN, OR PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION AND LAW 412 (Augusta, Me.,
Severance & Dorr 1840) (“All persons are capable of committing crimes unless there be a defect of
the will. But there must be both a vicious will and a vicious purpose . . . .”); The Legal Doctrine of
Insanity, 2 AM. L. MAG. 346, 346 (1844) (“The vicious will and the unlawful act, are the vital
elements of crime . . . .”); see also Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 55 (1933) (noting that criminal liability “is and always will be based upon a requisite state of
mind”).
69 Eugene J. Chesney, The Concepts of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, 29 J. AM. INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 627, 630 (1939).
70 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
56 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1644) (“So if one shoot at any wild fowle upon a tree, and the
arrow killeth any reasonable creature afar off, without any evill intent in him, this is per infortunium: for it was not unlawful to shoot at the wilde fowle: but if he had shot at a cock or hen, or any
tame fowle of another mans, and the arrow by mischance had killed a man, this had been murder,
for the act was unlawfull.”). This passage of the Institutes has occasioned much controversy, in
large part because it recognized the possibility of criminal punishment absent proof of a vicious
will. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 81–
85 (2004).
71 See generally Sayre, supra note 68 (tracing the development of these so-called public welfare
offenses).
72 See Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 595
(1963) (“[A] vast number of crimes have been construed . . . to dispense with any mental element,
or, to use the Code’s term, any requirement of culpability.”); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 731 (1960) (“The proliferation of so-called ‘strict
liability’ offenses in the criminal law has occasioned the vociferous, continued, and almost unanimous criticism of analysts and philosophers of the law.”).
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resulted in only minor punishment. But this was by no means always
the case. Even regulatory crimes could result in years of imprisonment.73
Even when mens rea was required, there was significant disagreement about what it meant. Some interpreted the requirement that there
be proof of a “vicious will” to require only proof that the defendant intended to do something immoral. The famous British case of Regina v.
Prince74 held that the defendant could be convicted for taking an unmarried girl under the age of sixteen years from the custody of her parents even though he genuinely believed that the girl he was charged with
taking was over the age of sixteen (which was not a crime).75 This result,
the Court insisted, did not undermine the doctrine of mens rea — to the
contrary, it gave it its “full scope”76 — because it penalized the defendant
for conduct that, even had the facts been as he supposed them, violated
the community’s moral norms.77
The conception of mens rea employed in Prince resonates with the
contemporary demand for apparent fault. Like apparent fault, it allows
defendants to be criminally sanctioned even when they do not intend
unlawful aims, so long as their actions violate a social understanding of
the law. It allows individuals to be sanctioned for conduct that they
should have known was wrong. But Prince’s approach proved controversial. Although many American courts followed Prince in concluding
that mens rea was satisfied so long as the defendant violated what the
judge perceived to be a widely held moral norm,78 commentators criticized the decision for injecting into the criminal law an overly indeterminate liability rule.79
By the late nineteenth century, courts had, as a result, largely turned
away from the moralistic approach to the mens rea inquiry articulated
in Prince. Instead, courts tended to find that the mens rea requirement
was satisfied if, but only if, the government was able to prove that the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
73 See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251, 254 (1922) (holding that defendant could
be indicted under a provision of the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act making selling coca without an
order form a felony); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 62, 65, 70 (1910) (upholding
the constitutionality of a statute that made it a felony to cut or remove timber without a valid
permit).
74 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875).
75 Id. at 173, 177.
76 Id. at 175.
77 Id. at 174–75.
78 See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II — Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of
Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 470 (1987).
79 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 12 (1957)
(criticizing Prince for introducing “arbitrariness” into the criminal law); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens
Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1025 (1932) (arguing that “[n]o two judges have the same standards of
morals” and that the decision in Prince “undoubtedly did more to confuse and unsettle the law [of
mens rea] than any recent case upon the subject”). Much the same criticism could be leveled against
the apparent fault rule, as we discuss in section III.C.
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defendant possessed whatever specific mental state was required by the
statute.80 Courts also upheld the power of the legislature to dispense
with mens rea when it so desired.81 The result was that consideration
of the defendant’s subjective fault played little practical role in late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century criminal law. Courts focused
instead on the “narrow and constrained question [of whether] the defendant’s conduct express[ed] the specific mental state . . . required by the
statute.”82
For its part, the Supreme Court vigorously endorsed the proposition
that it was up to legislators, not judges, to decide what mental state had
to be proven in order to convict someone of a crime. In Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. v. Minnesota,83 for example, it adamantly rejected the idea that the
Federal Constitution prohibited the legislature from criminally sanctioning those who violated the law but did so without a criminal intent.84
The case turned on a state law felony of cutting down timber without a
valid permit.85 The plaintiff argued that because, at the time he cut
down the timber, he reasonably believed that he possessed a valid permit
to do so, his conduct involved solely “innocent act[s]” that the government could not constitutionally punish.86 A unanimous Court dismissed
this argument. “The legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid and punish;
they may declare new crimes and establish rules of conduct for . . . future cases,” wrote Justice McKenna, quoting Justice Samuel Chase.87
Hence, “innocence cannot be asserted of an action which violates existing law, and ignorance of the law will not excuse.”88 In subsequent
cases, the Court held that the Constitution did require proof of criminal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
80 Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 640 (“The second and currently more predominant [mens rea] tradition adopts an essentially nonnormative approach that finds sufficient ground
for liability in the presence of particular states of mind without evaluating or even appealing to the
motives underlying the offender’s actions.”); Singer & Husak, supra note 25, at 860 (noting that
although “[a]t common law, courts enjoyed wide latitude to define the conditions under which conduct was innocent and thus not eligible for the criminal sanction[,] . . . [b]y the end of the twentieth
century, the judicial inquiry into guilt and blame . . . ostensibly came to be concerned with a much
more narrow and constrained question: Did the defendant’s conduct express the specific mental
state — the mens rea — required by the statute?”).
81 See Sayre, supra note 68, at 68–72.
82 Singer & Husak, supra note 25, at 860; see also id. at 860–61 (criticizing the twentieth-century
courts for focusing too much on statutory interpretation and thereby “los[ing] sight of the basic and
fundamental principle of justice that guided judgments of the courts in the nineteenth century: that
innocent conduct should be spared from criminal sanctions,” id. at 861).
83 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
84 Id. at 69–70.
85 Id. at 62–63.
86 Id. at 68.
87 Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)).
88 Id.
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intent when First Amendment rights were at stake.89 Otherwise, it declined to construe the Constitution as a limit on the legislature’s power
to “enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish.”90
The Court also vindicated Congress’s power to create vicarious strict
liability crimes. In United States v. Dotterweich,91 it endorsed the use of
vicarious strict liability as a tool to advance the general good. Dotterweich,
president and general manager of a corporation that repackaged and
sold drugs, was charged under a provision of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) making it a crime to “introduc[e] into interstate commerce . . . any . . . adulterated or misbranded” drug after the
corporation sold mislabeled drugs on several occasions due to incorrect
information received from the drug manufacturer.92 The jury acquitted
the corporation but convicted Dotterweich.93 The Court upheld the
conviction even though no evidence showed that Dotterweich knew the
labels contained incorrect information or that he had been involved in
the specific acts that resulted in their introduction into interstate commerce.94 The Court observed that the FDCA “dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct — awareness of some
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of
acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”95 Any hardship flowing from this
interpretation, noted the Court, fell “upon those who have at least the
opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed
for the protection of consumers,” and not upon “the innocent public.”96

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”); Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203, 209 (1961) (requiring, for prosecution under the membership provision of the federal Smith
Act, which prohibited belonging to “any organization which advocate[d] the overthrow of the
Government of the United States by force or violence,” id. at 205, evidence of “active and purposive
membership, purposive that is as to the organization’s criminal ends,” id. at 209).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) (“While the general rule at
common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every
crime, . . . there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the
purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement.”); United States v. Behrman, 258
U.S. 280, 288 (1922) (“It is enough to sustain an indictment that the offense be described with sufficient clearness to show a violation of law . . . . If the offense be a statutory one, and intent or
knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need not charge such knowledge or intent.”).
91 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
92 See id. at 278 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012)).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 280–81, 285.
95 Id. at 281.
96 Id. at 285.
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In yet other cases, the Court construed conspiracy statutes liberally,
making it easier to sanction individuals for criminal conduct they perhaps unintentionally aided and abetted. Pinkerton v. United States97
held that members of a continuing conspiracy could be liable for any
criminal act performed by co-conspirators so long as it was in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable.98 Although the Court
argued that a conspiratorial agreement was, by itself, evidence of a vicious will,99 in practice Pinkerton meant that defendants could be held
liable for criminal acts of their co-conspirators that they neither intended
nor knew anything about.100 Similarly, in cases dealing with antitrust
conspiracies, the Court allowed criminal liability under section 1 of the
Sherman Act if defendants’ acts had the effect of unreasonably restraining competition, even if they acted with “good intentions.”101 Individuals engaging in such practices, the Court declared, could be sanctioned
“without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use.”102 The result was that defendants
could receive sometimes very serious punishment for merely negligent,
but well-intentioned actions.103
On the surface, the 1957 decision in Lambert v. California104 appeared to signal a renewed commitment on the Court’s part to the importance of consideration of moral fault and innocence in criminal
cases.105 Lambert invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance that made it a
crime for anyone convicted of what was, or would be, a felony under
California state law to remain in the city for more than five days without
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
97
98
99

328 U.S. 640 (1946).
Id. at 647–48.
Id. at 646 (“Having joined in an unlawful scheme, having constituted agents for its performance, scheme and agency to be continuous until full fruition be secured, until he [or she] does
some act to disavow or defeat the purpose . . . [the defendant] is still offending. And we think,
consciously offending, offending as certainly, as we have said, as at the first moment of his [or her]
confederation, and consciously through every moment of its existence.” (quoting Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912))).
100 Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever
More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6 (1992) (noting that to be liable for the
crimes of co-conspirators under the Pinkerton rule “[l]iability is based upon a simple negligence
standard, reasonable foreseeability”).
101 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395, 397–98 (1927) (upholding convictions when the jury “found the agreements or combination complained of, . . . without regard to
the reasonableness of the prices fixed, or the good intentions of the combining units,” id. at 395).
102 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
103 Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 666–68 (2001)
(“Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, it has been clear
that the reasonableness standard applies as the default conduct rule in section 1 cases.” Id. at 666
(footnote omitted).).
104 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
105 Packer, supra note 32, at 127 (noting that Lambert was “the first invalidation by the Supreme
Court on mens rea grounds of legislation unrelated to the First Amendment”).
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registering.106 Justice Douglas’s majority opinion affirmed the “wide
latitude” lawmakers enjoyed “to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.”107 But, it continued, this ordinance was distinctive in punishing “conduct that [was]
wholly passive”108 in a situation where the “circumstances which might
move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are completely
lacking.”109 For this reason, the opinion concluded, “actual knowledge
of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and
subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under
the ordinance can stand.”110 “A law which punished conduct which
would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community,”
Justice Douglas added cryptically, “would be too severe for that community to bear.”111
Lambert hinted at a newly invigorated due process doctrine of mens
rea. It suggested that innocence — and fault — might have constitutional meaning after all. But the distinction it relied upon — between
conduct that was “wholly passive” and conduct that was not — was
hardly self-explanatory.112 Furthermore, as Justice Frankfurter cautioned in dissent, it is hard to see why this distinction mattered for due
process purposes.113 In any event, the Court did not subsequently rely
upon Lambert to strike down any other laws on due process grounds.114
Lower courts easily distinguished it.115 The result was that, as Professor
Herbert Packer mournfully noted in 1962 while surveying the “corpus
of the criminal law,” “the allegedly pervasive principle of mens rea is not
pervasive at all.”116 Instead, courts regularly imposed “the stigma of a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
106
107

355 U.S. at 226–27.
Id. at 228 (“We do not go with Blackstone in saying that ‘a vicious will’ is necessary to constitute a crime, for conduct alone without regard to the intent of the doer is often sufficient.” (citation
omitted) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *21)).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 229.
110 Id.
111 Id. (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881)).
112 Packer, supra note 32, at 132 (“It is a little hard to know what distinction Mr. Justice Douglas
was drawing.”).
113 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 231–32 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
114 Packer, supra note 32, at 136–37 (noting that “[t]he Court has not itself paid much attention
to Lambert,” id. at 136, and concluding that “this first foray in the direction of a general doctrine of
mens rea in constitutional law has been, as it seems, abortive,” id. at 137).
115 See, e.g., Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774, 784–85 (9th Cir. 1958) (distinguishing a federal
law that imposed strict liability on those who used narcotics or had been convicted of a narcotics
offense from leaving the United States without registering for a departure certificate on the ground
that the conduct prohibited by the law was “attended by circumstances which ‘move one to inquire
as to the necessity of registration,’” id. at 784 (quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229)); United States v.
Juzwiak, 258 F.2d 844, 847 (2d Cir. 1958) (same).
116 Packer, supra note 32, at 138.

1546

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:1525

criminal conviction on persons who are unaware of the factual circumstances that make their conduct potentially criminal or . . . who are,
without fault on their part, unaware of the existence of a legislative
norm affecting their conduct.”117
Eyeing state criminal codes, Packer and other members of the American
Law Institute attempted to rectify this by drafting a Model Penal Code
(MPC) that required a mens rea of at least gross negligence with respect
to each element of every crime.118 In this way, the drafters attempted
to ensure that those who violated the law innocently — that is, without
intending to achieve criminal aims, and without engaging in conduct
that flagrantly violated community norms of reasonable behavior —
were not held criminally liable. But while the MPC was in some respects a remarkable success, its attempt to reform courts’ approach to
the question of culpability had only a “modest effect.”119 In a study of
twenty-four states that adopted part or all of the MPC’s mens rea provisions by statute, Professor Darryl Brown determined that twelve states
failed to fully adopt the MPC’s strong affirmation of mens rea.120 More
relevant to the purposes of this Article, the MPC did not control Congress.
The result was that, notwithstanding repeated assertions by the Court
that without an evil mind there could be no crime, concepts of moral
fault and innocence played a relatively unimportant role in federal criminal law in the first half of the twentieth century.
II. APPARENT FAULT IN SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
A subtle but powerful reordering of certain parts of American
constitutional and federal substantive criminal law started in the 1970s
and has continued apace up to the present. The Court began increasingly to demand either direct or indirect evidence that the criminal defendant, or the government official, not only broke the law but also violated a social understanding of legality before the Court would award
remedies or impose punishment. The central aim of this Part is to document the emergence of these parallel demands for apparent fault. We
reserve our main analysis and preliminary explanation of this shift to
Parts III and IV, respectively. Our account emphasizes the steering hand
of the judiciary,121 rather than the influence of regulators or Congress.
We show how federal judges employed their hermeneutical authority to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
117
118

Id. at 147.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1985); cf. Packer, supra note 72, at 594
(“The most important aspect of the Code is its affirmation of the centrality of mens rea . . . .”).
119 Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 DUKE L.J.
285, 297 (2012).
120 Id. at 317.
121 Congress has played some role in sharpening the fault rule in the postconviction habeas context. Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 534–35 (2014).
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gloss federal criminal statutes with an additional screen of apparent
fault. In the constitutional domain, the same judges filled gaps in statutory remedial schemes with “creative,” de novo rules122 and narrowed
constitutional remedies using their authority to fashion “constitutional
common law.”123
A. Apparent Fault in Constitutional Remedies (and Beyond)
The Court’s new concern with the problem of the innocent lawbreaker first manifested in its constitutional remedies cases. These include damages remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its federal
common law analog action against federal officials,124 the exclusionary
rule under the Fourth Amendment,125 and the postconviction remedy of
habeas corpus.126 Otherwise heterogeneous in the sense that they straddle civil and criminal adjudication, these procedural vehicles are alike
insofar as all are triggered by an individual’s assertion that his or her
constitutional right has been violated. They all enable individuated constitutional redress of a sort — and so are appropriately grouped together
as constitutional remedies.127
1. Apparent Fault as a Regulatory Principle for Constitutional Remedies. — In the 1950s and the 1960s, jurisprudential developments in
constitutional remedies trended in favor of dispersed, relatively politically disempowered rights bearers such as criminal defendants, the convicted, and the objects of police surveillance or violence. Courts created
the exclusionary rule, rediscovered money damages under § 1983 and
Bivens128 actions, and fashioned vigorous postconviction habeas review.
These mechanisms furnished individual rights holders with powerful
instruments for negating the consequences of constitutional violations.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
122 For a critique of the “quite creative constructions of § 1983’s text and history,” see Jack M.
Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 51, 60 (1989).
123 Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term — Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1975) (supplying the exclusionary rule as an example of “a common
law power,” id. at 10, exercised by the Supreme Court in the remedial domain); see also George D.
Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit” — The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841,
870–71 (2009) (discussing the debate as to whether the Bivens remedy is constitutionally mandated).
124 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396–
97 (1971) (creating a private cause of action for money damages against federal officials who violate
some constitutional rules in their personal capacity).
125 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 657 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule as a remedy
for Fourth Amendment violations); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (applying the exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions).
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) (authorizing federal courts to grant habeas relief to prisoners); id.
§§ 2254, 2255 (setting forth, respectively, rules for state prisoners and federal prisoners).
127 Technically, federal habeas corpus relief is available for violations of “[f]ederal law,” id.
§ 2254(d)(1), but in practice the Constitution supplies almost all federal rules applicable to state
criminal adjudicative proceedings.
128 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388.
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But they also produced what the Court perceived as a flood of litigation.
In response, the Court developed, in each of these areas, a screening rule
for judicial intervention that sought to shield from litigation constitutional violations that were the product of what the Court viewed as
reasonable and well-intentioned government actions.
Consider the Court’s qualified immunity cases.129 As Part I explained,
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, official immunity from
suit for constitutional violations did not rest on the officials’ culpability.
It depended, instead, on the mandatory or discretionary character of the
official obligation.130 In 1949, Judge Hand’s ruling in Gregoire v. Biddle
shucked off the distinction between mandatory and discretionary in favor of a functional inquiry into whether an officer should benefit from
some sort of “immunity.”131 Anticipating a dominant motif in later jurisprudence, Judge Hand conceded that it would be “monstrous” to deny
relief to plaintiffs whose rights were violated by “truant” public officers,
but underscored the necessity of immunity to prevent officials who made
“honest[] mistake[s]” from suffering the burdens and risks of trial.132
“[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,” warned
Judge Hand, “to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its
outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the
most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.”133 Rationing at the courthouse door was required, in Judge Hand’s view,
given his assumption of a large class of innocent officials — officials
who carried out their duties in “good faith” — whose behavior might be
distorted by the shadow of tort liability.134
Gregoire concerned only the scope of absolute immunity. But, in
later cases, the Supreme Court echoed Gregoire’s worry that constitutional tort litigation might “dampen the ardor” of innocent government
officials in a sequence of decisions in which it recognized that certain
kinds of executive branch officials enjoyed qualified immunity from suit,
provided they acted with “good faith.”135 By allowing government officials to invoke a defense of good faith, the Court followed Gregoire in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
129 For excellent overviews of qualified immunity’s development, see Alan K. Chen, The Facts
About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233–61 (2006); and David Rudovsky, The Qualified
Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional
Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 55–56 (1989).
130 See supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
131 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. (“[I]t has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest
officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”).
135 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245–46 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555
(1967).
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striving to protect the rights of those “required to exercise their discretion.”136 It presented this concern as inextricable from “the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.”137
Over time, the Court ratcheted up the fault requirement to make the
security provided by qualified immunity to public officials ever more
impregnable.138 Initially, the Court hinged the defense of qualified immunity on officers’ subjective good faith, which required that the defendant either knew or reasonably should have known of the action’s
illegality for qualified immunity to be ousted.139 This first iteration of
a fault rule, however, proved ineffectual. Plaintiffs could simply allege
bad faith to get to trial, thwarting Judge Hand’s ambition to protect
“innocent” officials.140 The Court reacted by making it harder to defeat
qualified immunity. In Wood v. Strickland141 and Procunier v.
Navarette,142 it held that government officials would be subject to liability only if they violated constitutional rights “clearly established” at
the time they acted.143 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,144 the Court discarded
the subjective prong of the good faith test. Instead, it held that government officials acted in bad faith only when they “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”145 The Court later explained that this test would
be applied in a “more particularized” sense, so that the illegality of an
alleged violation “must be apparent.”146
The Court’s insistence that official conduct must violate rights that
were clearly established at a high degree of specificity has meant that,
notwithstanding its overt concern with the reasonableness of the official’s action, the good faith test of qualified immunity now shields from
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
136 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506
(1978)).
137 Id. (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 506).
138 Id. (“For executive officials in general . . . our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.”).
139 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1975).
140 Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 908 (1984) (“The implication of this
fact-oriented evaluation of good faith was that courts would find it extremely difficult to dispose of
the qualified immunity question at an early stage of the litigation — for example, prior to discovery.”).
141 420 U.S. 308.
142 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
143 Navarette, 434 U.S. at 565 (holding that there can be no § 1983 liability when “there [is] no
‘clearly established’ . . . right” at the time of the alleged tort’s commission); Wood, 420 U.S. at 322
(“A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school board member has acted with such
an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student’s clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.”).
144 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
145 Id. at 818.
146 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); accord Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012,
2023 (2014).
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liability not only government officials who make reasonable mistakes
but all officials who act in ways that are not obviously unconstitutional.
Indeed, today the Court characterizes the qualified immunity standard
as shielding “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.”147
The practical effect of this specification of qualified immunity is that
plaintiffs commonly find it necessary “to plead and prove intentional
misconduct in order to rebut qualified immunity defenses.”148 This is
why, somewhat paradoxically, the Court’s concern with “innocent” officials means that qualified immunity operates as a demand for clear and
objective context-specific evidence of defendants’ bad mental states.
Even when such evidence is available, moreover, the fact that a defendant’s actions might be “objectively justified” in retrospect is exculpatory.149 The screening rule of qualified immunity is hence not simply a
demand for evidence of subjective fault or mens rea. It is a demand for
exceptionally clear evidence that a defendant’s actions were so objectively ultra vires that he or she either knew or should have known that
what he or she did was wrong. It is a demand, that is, for apparent
fault.
A similar transformation occurred in the Court’s exclusionary rule
jurisprudence. Since the early twentieth century, the Court had required
that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment be excluded from federal criminal trials.150 In 1961, it extended this rule to
state criminal trials.151 In 1984, however, the Court in United States v.
Leon152 held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to material gathered as a result of erroneous warrants upon which police had reasonably
relied.153 It thus seeded a pool of rights holders with no realistic means
of redress.154 It did so in order to prevent the same evil it invoked in its
qualified immunity cases: the potential chilling of “objectively reasonable
law enforcement activity.”155
As was also true of the qualified immunity cases, the Court came to
interpret this “reasonableness” exception to the exclusionary rule expansively. Leon was at first limited to cases in which the issuing magistrate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
147 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)).
148 Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1028 (2010); see also id. at 1028 n.91.
149 al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 740.
150 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94, 398 (1914).
151 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
152 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
153 Id. at 920–22.
154 Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (noting that “the Leon majority has withdrawn that remedy in a class of cases for which no other remedy is available”).
155 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.
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had made a mistake, and the officer had reasonably relied on the resulting warrant. But it was quickly extended to contexts in which other
nonpolice actors erred.156 The Court also refused to allow exclusion
when what was alleged was simple negligence. As it explained in
Herring v. United States,157 “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it.”158 This did not mean, the Court made clear, that the police
officer had to be shown to have deliberately violated another’s Fourth
Amendment rights.159 It did mean, however, that exclusion was appropriate only if and “[w]hen the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or
‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights.”160 In its
exclusionary rule cases, just as in its qualified immunity cases, the Court
has, in other words, made the availability of the constitutional remedy
hinge on a showing that an officer’s conduct not only violated the
Fourth Amendment but also did so in an especially explicit and egregious manner. Contempt for the law must be written on the face of the
police encounter.
Consider two recent examples. In Heien v. North Carolina,161 the
Court denied the exclusionary remedy when an officer stopped the defendant for violating a regulation that a state court subsequently found
did not cover the conduct at issue.162 The Heien Court extended the
reasonableness exception to include not only officers’ “reasonable mistake[s] of fact” but also their “reasonable mistake[s] of law,”163 thus barring exclusion when “the officer’s error of law was reasonable.”164
Heien’s creation of a reasonable mistake of law exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s protections is a qualitative leap in the Court’s willingness
to assume officers’ good faith. It suggests that exclusion requires a set
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
156 For extensions of Leon, see Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), which extended the
Leon good faith exception to instances in which police rely on later-overruled appellate or Supreme
Court precedent, id. at 241; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009), which barred exclusion when an error in warrant was due to negligence by police personnel, id. at 147–48; Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), which barred exclusion when an error was due to negligence by a clerk of
the court, id. at 14–16; Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), which upheld searches pursuant to
warrants issued as a result of legislative mistakes, id. at 359–60; and Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978), which held that criminal defendants can defeat a warrant based on flaws in the underlying affidavits only in cases of “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless disregard for the truth,” id. at
171.
157 555 U.S. 135.
158 Id. at 144.
159 Id. (construing the exclusionary rule to deter not only “deliberate . . . conduct” but also conduct that was “reckless, or grossly negligent” and stating that the rule might “in some circumstances
[also apply to] recurring or systemic negligence”).
160 Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).
161 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
162 Id. at 540.
163 Id. at 536.
164 Id. at 540.
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of facts that on their face make it clear that the officer violated a rule
he or she should have known about — in effect, evidence that the officer
acted with something akin to a “vicious will.”165
Then, in Strieff, the Court addressed the question of when the fruit
of a search incident to arrest following a plainly unlawful street stop had
to be excluded.166 As we noted earlier, because the Strieff majority
found the initial unlawful stop to be “negligent” and a “good-faith” mistake, it concluded that exclusion was not required.167 Like Heien, Strieff
involved a seizure without adequate lawful authority in violation of
Terry v. Ohio168 — hardly an obscure precedent. Again, the concededly
unlawful character of the officers’ behavior was insufficient to oust the
judicial presumption of “good faith” and “reasonableness.” As such,
these cases reflect, once again, the Court’s concern with sheltering “all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”169
Finally, a demand for apparent fault increasingly provides an organizing principle in the postconviction context. In net, habeas law’s complex morass of procedural rules, plural standards of review, and nonstatutory presumptions “allocates relief based on a normative judgment
about the degree to which both the state and its prisoners have complied
with relevant legal norms.”170 Typically, petitioners “prevail . . . by
demonstrating an extraordinary measure of fault akin to gross negligence or recklessness on the part of the state.”171 Gatekeeping doctrines
that titrate habeas relief, in contrast, are designed to “reflect a ‘presumption that state courts know and follow the law.’”172 Relief issues only
when it is exceptionally clear on the face of the record that the state
courts did not do so.
As with exclusionary-rule jurisprudence, the notion of fault here is
a borrowing from constitutional tort jurisprudence.173 And as in the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
165 Cf. Richard H. McAdams, Close Enough for Government Work? Heien’s Less-than-Reasonable
Mistake of the Rule of Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 147, 166–67 (noting recent evidence that police in
Kansas City, Missouri frequently engaged in pretextual investigatory stops and that minority drivers were a disproportionate target of these stops).
166 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060–63 (2016).
167 Id. at 2063.
168 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
169 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)).
170 Huq, supra note 121, at 528.
171 Id.
172 Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti,
537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).
173 See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990) (citing Leon with approval); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1735 (1991) (discussing the parallels between qualified immunity
and habeas doctrine); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 635–40 (1993)
(same).
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exclusionary-rule context, the strength of the presumption of faultlessness on officials’ part has waxed over time. Its current apogee in the
habeas context is a 2011 case, Harrington v. Richter,174 in which the
Court held that a federal habeas court must defer not only to those legal
grounds offered by state judges for denying a constitutional claim but
also to hypothetical, never-expressed reasons that might support dismissal of that claim.175 Two years later, in Johnson v. Williams,176 the
Court extended Richter to hold that, when a state court rules against a
defendant in an opinion that rejects some of the defendant’s claims but
does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must
nevertheless presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits.177 Some circuit courts have further extended
Richter’s logic to allow federal habeas courts to hypothesize, in the face
of an unreasonable and erroneous state court ruling, an alternative
ground of decision and to thereby deny habeas relief.178 Even open and
manifest error in convicting a state prisoner to a term of years or death,
on this view, is not sufficient for relief.179 What is required instead is
evidence that the state court acted on the basis of a view of the law, or
the evidence, that no reasonable or fair-minded person could hold.180
2. The Parallel Emergence of Apparent Fault in Substantive Constitutional Law. — Beginning in the 1970s, a similar concern with the innocence or fault of state actors emerged as an important regulatory principle in the Court’s substantive constitutional law cases. This trend was
not universal. The Court continued to recognize that Fourth Amendment
rights, for example, can be violated by merely negligent — even well–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
174
175
176
177
178

562 U.S. 86 (2011).
Id. at 102.
568 U.S. 289 (2013).
Id. at 298.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1227, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. granted
sub nom. Wilson v. Sellers, 137 S. Ct. 1203 (2017); accord Cannedy v. Adams, 733 F.3d 794, 797 (9th
Cir. 2013) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (taking the same position). But see, e.g., Grueninger v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 813 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e
may assume that the Supreme Court of Virginia has endorsed the reasoning of the Circuit Court in
denying [the defendant’s] claim, and it is that reasoning that we are to evaluate . . . .”).
179 Richter cited “a state judiciary [wish] to concentrate its resources on the cases where opinions
are most needed” as a justification for its decision. 562 U.S. at 99. This again reflects a presumption
that state officials are acting in good faith, and that the costs of burdening their behavior at the
margin cannot be effectively defrayed by the benefits of remediation. Stephen R. Reinhardt, Essay,
The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing
Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly
Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1229 (2015) (noting that, if Richter’s language
was taken literally, “in order to grant habeas relief, [federal judges] would need to find that each of
the state court judges who denied the petitioner’s claim was not fairminded”).
180 Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state
court’s decision.” (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004))).
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intentioned — state actions, even as it denied litigants remedial relief
absent proof of fault.181 But in two areas of constitutional law, the demand for either specific evidence of bad intent or apparent fault has
come to play an increasingly pivotal role.
The first involves claims of unconstitutional deprivations of individuals’ procedural rights. These cases tend to arise among populations
somehow subject to state supervision, whether in a carceral context or
a governmental employment context,182 or who depend on the government for some form of social assistance.183 In this domain, the Court
has held that allegations of government negligence alone are not sufficient to state a claim under the procedural prong of the Due Process
Clause.184 It has also consigned due process violations alleged to be the
result of “random and unauthorized” state action (as opposed to systemic
policies) to state tribunals by creating a state remedies exhaustion requirement.185 And, at least in some contexts — for example, in cases in
which the government is accused of violating due process by failing to
preserve evidence — the Court has required the criminal defendant to
prove the government’s “bad faith.”186
At the same time as qualified immunity was calcifying into its current form, in other words, the Court held that isolated or merely negligent state actions could not violate the Due Process Clause.187 Also
around the same time, the Court developed a distinction between unconstitutional random acts and unconstitutional policies in its Eighth
Amendment cases,188 hence limiting federal court access in Eighth
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
181 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (noting that “the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment” and that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis”).
182 Stephen Braun, U.S. Intelligence Officials to Monitor Federal Employees with Security Clearances, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 10, 2014, 9:46 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/usintelligence-officials-monitor-federal-employees-security-clearances [https://perma.cc/C2Z4-RDD2].
183 See Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, “The Crime of Survival”: Fraud Prosecutions, Community Surveillance, and the Original “Welfare Queen,” 41 J. SOC. HIST. 329, 334–37 (2007) (documenting the
rise of surveillance elements within welfare provisions from the 1970s onward in Illinois).
184 Supernumerary in the constitutional tort context, this requirement has potential bite when
injunctive or declaratory relief is sought.
185 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (holding that no due process deprivation has occurred if the state provides adequate post-deprivation process to remedy “random and unauthorized,” id. at 541, acts of state officers), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (extending Parratt’s exhaustion principle to
intentional torts). In general, there is no exhaustion requirement for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
186 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
187 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330–31 (holding that merely negligent acts do not amount to a deprivation
under the Due Process Clause).
188 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (requiring proof of deliberate indifference of prison officials to state an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect from injury or
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Amendment cases to instances in which a state official acts with sufficient
intentionality and generality to warrant the label of “policymaking.”189
Second, an intent rule has come to dominate the equal protection law
related to race and gender. Prior to the mid-1970s, the Court’s racial
equality jurisprudence gave no priority to notions of discriminatory intent.190 Rather, the Court in this era “did not sharply distinguish proof
of purpose and proof of impact.”191 In the 1971 decision Palmer v.
Thompson,192 for example, the Court declared that “no case in this Court
has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because
of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”193 Within five years,
however, the Court in Washington v. Davis194 repudiated Palmer’s approach and insisted on evidence of an unconstitutional motive as a predicate of equal protection liability.195 It subsequently interpreted this to
mean that plaintiffs in equal protection cases had to show that a government actor selected a particular course of action in order to harm a
disfavored group.196 What was required, in other words, was evidence
of something close to malice.197
The Court also imposed a heavy evidentiary burden on plaintiffs
who sought to prove the existence of a discriminatory purpose,198 thus

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
assault); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (requiring a showing of malicious or sadistic use
of force in Eighth Amendment claims by prisoners for excessive force).
189 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 136–38 (1990) (holding that Parratt does not apply
when the deprivation was foreseeable and authorized — as distinct from random and unauthorized — and when predeprivation process would have been feasible); see also Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436–37 (1982) (holding that postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due
process where deprivation is caused by established state procedures).
190 Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1131–35 (1997) (describing the doctrinal shift to an intentbased model of equal protection in the mid-1970s).
191 Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term — Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 12 (2013).
192 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
193 Id. at 224.
194 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
195 Id. at 239 (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act,
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).
196 Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker,
in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” (citation and
footnote omitted)).
197 Siegel, supra note 190, at 1135.
198 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459, 470 (1996); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999) (dismissing a selective prosecution claim
without analyzing whether the evidentiary burden could be overcome).
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insulating most kinds of facially neutral government actions from constitutional equality challenge.199 Only in the rare instance in which evidence of bias somehow makes its way to a litigant outside the discovery
process can courts usually even reach the merits of an equal protection
challenge to a facially neutral law or policy.200 It is only, that is, when
the bad intent of the government actor becomes starkly apparent that
litigants can hope to vindicate equal protection rights.201
B. Apparent Fault and Substantive Federal Criminal Law
The rise of apparent fault in the Court’s federal criminal law jurisprudence has been more tentative and limited than in the constitutional
remedies and Fourteenth Amendment contexts. This is in part a result
of the Court’s persistent refusal to interpret the Constitution to impose
anything but the weakest constraint on legislatures’ ability to dispense
with mens rea. While Lambert remains in principle good law, the Court
has not subsequently identified any other criminal law whose lack of a
mens rea element violates the Due Process Clause.202 Although the
Court has continued to impose a weighty scienter requirement when
First Amendment rights are involved,203 elsewhere it has repeatedly
vested legislators with “wide latitude . . . to declare an offense and to
exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.”204 The
Court’s unwillingness to constitutionalize mens rea has restricted lower
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
199 See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) (contending that the standard established by the Court in
Armstrong is nearly impossible for many defendants with meritorious claims to satisfy).
200 See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–55 (2016) (permitting defendant to bring a
challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), after defendant found evidence of discrimination related to preemptory jury strikes in the contents of the prosecution file obtained via a state
open-records request).
201 The one important exception to this general rule involves equal protection claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation. In these cases, as Professor Russell Robinson recently argued,
the Court has proven much more willing to infer bad intent from “context and history.” Russell K.
Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 180 (2016); see also id. at 155 (“[T]he variant
of animus that the Court seemed to apply in Obergefell is novel in its generosity to plaintiffs asserting
equality claims . . . .”) (referencing landmark same-sex marriage case Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015)).
202 Lower courts have, however, on occasion applied Lambert to narrow the scope of criminal
laws or to strike them down entirely. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Alameida, 366 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir.
2004) (construing Lambert to require that a convicted sex offender must be shown to have actual
knowledge of his or her duty to register in order to be liable for failure to register); Conley v. United
States, 79 A.3d 270, 273 (D.C. 2013) (invalidating local law making it a felony to be in a car knowing
that another in the vehicle unlawfully possesses a firearm, even when “the defendant [has no] notice
of any legal duty” to leave the car).
203 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
204 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
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courts’ freedom to fashion criminal liability rules to accord with normative or policy judgments, as happens in the common law crafting of
constitutional remedies. Only when confronted with otherwise ambiguous
statutes can judges make decisions about what kind of fault is required.
As a result, the diffusion of the fault principle in federal criminal law
has worked through the judicial power of statutory interpretation, rather
than constitutional adjudication of the kind employed in Lambert. The
power vested in judges to interpret statutes to include fault concerns is
considerable, however. Because federal criminal statutes frequently fail
to specify precisely what mens rea they require or contain ambiguous
actus reus requirements, federal courts in practice enjoy substantial latitude to determine how broadly or narrowly to construe criminal liability.205 Exercising this interpretive freedom, the Supreme Court has increasingly glossed statutes to avoid imposing liability on those who act
negligently, or recklessly, or even in some cases, purposefully, but who
have not been shown to have acted in ways that represent a sufficiently
clear violation of social understandings of proper behavior.
The Court signaled the potency of statutory interpretation as a vehicle for infusing federal criminal law with concerns about fault and innocence five years before Lambert’s false start, in Morissette v. United
States.206 Morissette held that courts should not presume that Congress’s
failure to explicitly require evidence of mens rea when it codified common law crimes necessarily meant that those crimes should be construed
to impose strict liability.207 Because the notion that crime “constituted
only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing
hand”208 took “deep and early root in American soil,”209 the Court held
that Congress should be presumed to have intended to include some
kind of mens rea requirement when it codified common law crimes.210
But the Court cautioned that when Congress did not “borrow[] terms of
art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice,”211 the presumption in favor of mens rea would fall
away.212
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
205 Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 347
(“[F]ederal criminal law, no less than other statutory domains, is dominated by judge-made law
crafted to fill the interstices of open-textured statutory provisions.”).
206 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
207 Id. at 263.
208 Id. at 251.
209 Id. at 252.
210 Id. at 263 (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word . . . .”).
211 Id.
212 See id. at 260 (“The conclusion reached in the Balint and Behrman cases has our approval
and adherence for the circumstances to which it was there applied.”).
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In subsequent decades, federal courts read Morissette’s mens rea rule
for common law crimes narrowly. Courts interpreted federal statutes as
codifications of common law crimes only when specific common law
terms appeared in the text.213 Even then, judges refused to add mens
rea when doing so appeared “inconsistent with the statute’s purpose.”214
As a result, lower federal courts continued to interpret many federal
crimes as strict liability offenses.215 Conviction required a showing that
the defendant intentionally performed the acts proscribed by law, not
evidence of wrongful intention.216 Even when statutes did explicitly
require proof of some kind of mens rea, courts refused to interpret this
to mean that the defendant had to have acted intentionally or knowledgeably with respect to each element of the crime.217
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the Court started to evince
increasing concern about the risk that criminal liability might fall upon
defendants who acted without full knowledge of the facts that made
their conduct criminal or who otherwise did not manifestly possess a
“vicious will.” An early sign of this concern was its repudiation of strict
liability in the antitrust context.218 In 1978, United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.219 unsettled decades of precedent by holding that
bad intent of some sort had to be proven in all criminal prosecutions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
213 E.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 264 (2000) (“The canon on imputing common law
meaning applies only when Congress makes use of a statutory term with established meaning at
common law . . . .”).
214 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594–95 (1990) (“This Court has declined to follow any
rule that a statutory term is to be given its common-law meaning, when that meaning is obsolete
or inconsistent with the statute’s purpose.”); see also Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 362 (1983)
(holding that the common law meaning of “larceny” was not incorporated in the Bank Robbery Act
because “[t]he congressional goal of protecting bank assets is entirely independent of the traditional
distinction on which [the defendant] relies”); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1979)
(holding that the Travel Act prohibition on bribery does not codify the common law crime of bribery
because, by the time it was enacted, “federal and state statutes had extended the term bribery well
beyond its common-law meaning,” id. at 43); United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1969)
(holding that the Travel Act did not incorporate the common law definition of “extortion,” because
such an interpretation would conflict with the Act’s purpose “to curb the activities of organized
crime,” id. at 293).
215 See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Weiler,
458 F.2d 474, 477–80 (3d Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607–10 (1971).
216 See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 675 (1975) (upholding jury instructions that
asserted that company president could be liable under a federal law that prohibited the adulteration
of food shipped in interstate commerce “even if he did not consciously do wrong” so long as he was
in a “responsible relation to the situation,” id. at 665 n.9).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 488 F.2d 652, 654–55 (1st Cir. 1973) (upholding conviction
of defendants charged with assaulting federal officers even though the government did not show
that they knew their victims’ identities). See generally Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2012).
218 See supra text accompanying notes 101–103.
219 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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under the Sherman Act.220 The Court thought this requirement necessary to avoid imposing liability on defendants who made “good-faith
error[s] of judgment”221 in a context wherein it could not easily distinguish “the behavior proscribed by the Act . . . from the gray zone of
socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct.”222
The Court required explicit proof of bad intent, in order to safeguard
actors who violated the law but behaved in accord with socially accepted understandings.
Antitrust law was not to be sui generis. Seven years later in Liparota
v. United States,223 the Court again construed a federal statute narrowly
to avoid imposing liability on individuals who neither knew nor should
have known that their conduct violated a legal rule.224 Liparota concerned a restaurant owner who sold food stamps at a substantial discount to their face value225 and was prosecuted under a federal statute
prohibiting “knowingly . . . transfer[ring]” food stamps “in any manner
not authorized by [law].”226 The lower courts held that the defendant
could be convicted because he “realized what he was doing, and was
aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance,
mistake, or accident.”227 Reversing, the Court held that the government
also had to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct was “unauthorized by statute or regulations.”228
In interpreting the statute to require proof that the defendant not
only broke the law intentionally but also did so knowing that his conduct was unlawful, the Court violated the general principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse — as Justice White pointed out in dissent.229 The Court justified doing so by arguing that it was necessary
to avoid “criminaliz[ing] a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.”230 This was because, given the nature of the conduct that the
statute regulated, individuals could easily violate its prohibition knowingly even when they did not seek to achieve criminal aims, or act in an
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
220 Id. at 436 (“We are unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as mandating a regime of strictliability criminal offenses.”); accord George E. Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will: Developing Standards for Criminal Intent in Sherman Act Prosecutions, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 391
& n.16 (1980).
221 U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441.
222 Id. at 440–41.
223 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
224 See id. at 433–34.
225 Id. at 421–22.
226 Id. at 420 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1982)).
227 Id. at 422.
228 Id. at 425.
229 Id. at 441 (White, J., dissenting) (“In relying on the ‘background assumption of our criminal
law’ that mens rea is required, the Court ignores the equally well founded assumption that ignorance of the law is no excuse.” (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 426 (majority opinion))).
230 Id. at 426 (majority opinion).
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unreasonable or socially prohibited manner.231 It thus rejected what the
dissent (persuasively) argued was the most linguistically natural reading
of the statute232 in order to avoid imposing liability on those who did
not know, and should not reasonably be expected to know, that their
conduct violated the law. It read into the food stamp law, in other
words, a demand for apparent fault.
Several years later, in Cheek v. United States,233 the Court again
construed a federal statute to require knowledge that one’s conduct violated the law.234 The defendant claimed that he failed to file his income
taxes, as required by federal law, because he genuinely believed he had
no constitutional duty to do so.235 He was convicted after the trial court
instructed the jury that Cheek’s mistake of law could excuse his conduct
only if it was reasonable.236 The Supreme Court reversed.237 Even
unreasonable mistakes could be excused, it held, given the complexity
of the federal tax code and the risk that defendants could innocently,
even if unreasonably, believe their conduct was lawful when it was
not.238 What needed to be shown to establish liability, therefore, was
knowledge that one’s actions violated the law.239 Again, an extraordinary kind of mens rea was employed to shield against the prospect of
imposing liability on defendants who did not intentionally violate the
law or, the Court suggested, a well-established social understanding of
what the law required.240
Three years after that, in Staples v. United States,241 the Court once
again read a mens rea requirement into a federal law that had not previously been interpreted to require it — once again to avoid imposing
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
231 Id. at 432–33 (arguing that lesser mens rea was required when “Congress . . . rendered criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation,” id. at 433, but that this was not such a case).
232 Id. at 434–36 (White, J., dissenting).
233 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
234 Id. at 206–07.
235 Id. at 195–96.
236 Id. at 196–97.
237 Id. at 201.
238 See id. at 200–01.
239 Id. at 201 (“Willfulness, . . . in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the
law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily
and intentionally violated that duty.”).
240 One could read Cheek, in its acceptance of even unreasonable but genuine mistakes of law as
a defense to liability under the federal tax law, to establish something closer to a subjective fault
standard than an apparent fault standard. The language in the opinion suggests, however, that the
Court was not convinced that even the basic requirement to file taxes was sufficiently clear and
widely shared to justify extending liability to those who violated it. See id. at 205 (noting that “in
‘our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to
follow the law,’ and ‘[i]t is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of opinion or
innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care’” (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360–61 (1973))).
241 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
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liability on the “apparently innocent.”242 Staples involved the prosecution of a defendant who possessed a semiautomatic machine gun modified so as to be capable of fully automatic fire.243 The gun was unregistered in violation of the National Firearms Act.244 Staples contended
that he could not be penalized unless the government proved that, at
the time he possessed the gun, he knew it had been modified to be capable of automatic fire.245 Lower courts rejected this argument.246 The
trial judge instructed the jury that liability could rest on proof that the
defendant knew “that he [was] dealing with a dangerous device of a type
as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.”247 The Court reversed, once again cautioning of the risk that liability could be imposed
on those who had no reason to suspect they were in violation of the
law.248 Although guns may be “dangerous device[s],” the Court explained, this did not mean that their possession was “not also entirely
innocent.”249
Liparota, Cheek, and Staples implicitly reject the thesis articulated
in Shevlin-Carpenter that innocence is whatever the legislature says it
is.250 Instead, these cases insist that federal courts interpret federal statutes to avoid imposing criminal liability on those who did not possess a
vicious will or know that their conduct was likely to be regulated by the
criminal law — at least absent clear evidence of contrary legislative intent.251 Formally cases about mens rea, these cases are also usefully

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

Id. at 610 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 604.
Id. (quoting trial transcript).
Id. at 619–20.
Id. at 611.
Other cases from the same period in which the Court employed the same approach include
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37 (1994), which held that a conviction for “willfully”
structuring financial transactions to evade reporting requires proof that a defendant not only intended to violate the federal reporting laws but did so knowing his or her conduct was unlawful,
because “currency structuring is not [an] inevitably nefarious [act],” id. at 144; and United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68–69 (1994), in which the Court held that a conviction for
interstate trafficking of child pornography requires knowledge of all its elements, lest the law
“sweep within the ambit of the statute actors who had no idea that they were even dealing with
sexually explicit material,” id. at 69.
251 See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (“Absent indication of contrary
purpose in the language or legislative history of the statute, we believe that [the food stamp fraud
law] requires a showing that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or
regulations.”); see also X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72–78 (“Morissette, reinforced by Staples,
instructs that the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct,” id. at 72, “so long as such a reading is
not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress,” id. at 78.).
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understood to be demands for statutory readings that preclude punishment unless there is clear evidence that a defendant violated the social
understanding of legality.
In subsequent decades, the Court continued to add mens rea requirements to federal criminal laws as a hedge to protect the “apparently
innocent” against liability. In some (but hardly all) cases, mens rea was
imposed on criminal statutes in the shadow of the First Amendment. In
Elonis v. United States,252 for example, the Court held that a federal
statute that made it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce “any
communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another”253 did not prohibit merely negligent behavior — behavior that a
reasonable observer would interpret as a threat — but required some
kind of subjective fault.254 The Court cited Liparota, Staples, and their
progeny for the proposition that “[w]hen interpreting federal criminal
statutes that are silent on the required mental state, we read into the
statute ‘only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from “otherwise innocent conduct.”’”255 Despite the absence of
First Amendment language in the decision, one could interpret the
Court’s reading of the law as partly a product of its concern about the
peril that a broader reading of the threats that criminal law might pose
to expressive freedom.
Judicial concern with “innocent” behavior being penalized has continued to exercise a gravitational pull in the Court’s criminal cases, however, even in cases involving statutes that do not create obvious First
Amendment concerns. Three cases are illustrative.
First, in 1999 the Court in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers
of California256 interpreted a federal law that prohibited “giv[ing] . . .
anything of value to any public official, . . . for . . . any official act”257
as applying only to gifts that were intended as “reward[s] for some future
act that the public official will take . . . or for a past act that he has
already taken.”258 The Court rejected the government’s argument that
the statute applied more broadly, to gifts that were given to government
officials “motivated, at least in part, by the recipient’s capacity to exercise governmental power or influence in the donor’s favor.”259 The Court
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
252
253
254

135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
Id. at 2004 (omission in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012)).
See id. at 2011. Although the Court made clear that mere negligence was insufficient to
convict, it did not reach a conclusion about whether a showing of recklessness was sufficient. Id.
at 2012.
255 Id. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)); see id. at 2009–11.
256 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
257 Id. at 401 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (1994)).
258 Id. at 405.
259 Id. (quoting Brief for the United States Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae at 17,
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. 398 (No. 98-131)).
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asserted that its significantly narrower reading of the statute’s reach was
not only the more “natural” one260 but also was necessary to avoid
creating a “snare[] for the unwary.”261 The government’s view of the
statute, the Court warned, would “criminalize . . . token gifts to the
President . . . such as the replica jerseys given by championship sports
teams each year during ceremonial White House visits”262 or “a high
school principal’s gift of a school baseball cap to the Secretary of Education, by reason of his office, on the occasion of the latter’s visit to the
school.”263 Criminalizing such obviously innocent acts, the Court intimated, could not have been Congress’s intent when it enacted the law,
even if the statutory text could be stretched to reach them.264
Second, in Yates v. United States,265 the Court held that a provision
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibiting the knowing destruction of any
“tangible object with the intent to impede . . . [a federal] investigation”266 applied only to objects “use[d] to record or preserve information”
and not — as the government had argued — to any physical object.267
The Court’s narrow interpretation of the statute’s text was again motivated by its desire to avoid creating snares for the unwary. The government’s reading of the statute, the Court argued, would mean “expos[ing]
individuals to 20-year prison sentences for tampering with any physical
object that might have evidentiary value in any federal investigation
into any offense, no matter whether the investigation is pending or
merely contemplated, or whether the offense subject to investigation is
criminal or civil.”268 It thus limited the range of objects to which the
statute applied in order to protect those who had no reason to know that
their conduct courted criminal penalties.269 It cited Liparota to the effect that criminal statutes should “provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal.”270 Once again, the Court interpreted a statutory
actus reus element in order to ensure that it reached only those who
were obviously at fault.271
Finally, as we explained in the Introduction, in McDonnell, the Court
held that a federal law prohibiting officials from performing “official
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

Id. at 406.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 406–07.
Id. at 407.
See id. at 406, 408–09.
135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
Id. at 1078 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id. (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985)).
Note, however, that the effect of Yates is to limit the statute’s reach to the white-collar context.
This element of Yates is hence a counterexample to the general trend we observe of favoring the
prosecution of street crime over “suite crime.” See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
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acts” in exchange for gifts from others applied only in cases in which the
official made a decision or took an action on a pending government issue.272 Simply arranging meetings or hosting events in exchange for
gifts, the Court made clear, did not violate the terms of the law.273 Once
more, the Court expressed concern about a broad reading’s effect on
“conscientious” government actors.274
In a wide array of cases, then, the Court has construed diverse federal criminal laws to avoid imposing liability on “innocent” or “apparently innocent” conduct — that is, on the conduct of reasonable lawabiding persons (high school principals, conscientious legislators, lawful
gun owners).275 By either reading into the law a stringent mens rea
requirement or construing the actus reus element narrowly, the Court
ensures that only defendants evincing apparent fault are found liable.
These decisions reflect the Court’s concern that punishment track not
just the law on the books but also its judgments of what counts as a
social understanding of legality.
III. APPARENT FAULT AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF STATE POWER
We begin in this Part by examining how apparent fault may shape
the paths by which state resources, and in particular the state’s coercion,
flow across and among different policy domains and populations. We
contend that the doctrinal architecture described in Part II can channel
both when and how state officials intervene in private ordering. It
thereby operates as an obscure yet potent mechanism by which federal
judges nudge the state to target this home over that business, to apply
coercion against this population and not that one, and to penalize one
species of criminality and not another. In brief, the rise of apparent fault
influences how we, the people, tangibly experience the state.
To flesh this out, we develop three claims in this Part. First, we
explain how and why an apparent fault requirement likely influences
official behavior. Second, as prefigured in Parts I and II, we identify
noteworthy discontinuities in the judicial demand for apparent fault.
Third, we argue that the ensuing “gappiness” has distributive effects: by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
272
273
274
275

136 S. Ct. 2355, 2368–71 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 2372.
Lower courts have followed the Court’s lead. See, e.g., United States v. Project on Gov’t
Oversight, 616 F.3d 544, 550–51 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (construing a statute making it a crime to compensate government officials for government services to require proof of specific intent in order to avoid
penalizing innocent conduct); United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82, 88–90 (2d Cir. 2000)
(construing a statute that prohibits the importation of wild animals or birds under inhumane or
unhealthful conditions to require proof that the defendant knew the conditions were inhumane or
unhealthful).
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making it more or less costly to pursue different kinds of legal claims, it
shapes the choices that state actors make between different policy goals
and instruments. Apparent fault does not per se make the stick and the
sword unattractive policy tools, but by paying attention to when and
against whom coercion is more costly, we can discern better the effects
of judicial innovation of the fundamental contours of state action.276
One implication of our analysis is that it is a mistake to assume that
imposing a fault demand on criminal liability will necessarily diminish
the coercive or carceral reach of the state: rather than acting as a friction, apparent fault is a valve that directs the flow of coercion toward
different populations.
A. Apparent Fault as Tax and Subsidy
A judicial demand for apparent fault has bilateral effects: it can either enable or deter state action. Where governmental actors are forced
to substantiate fault before they can take coercive action, their transaction costs increase. The result is to make it less likely that such action
will occur. In contrast, when it is those who are targeted by coercive
state action who must prove the bad intentions of adversely positioned
officials, the expected frictions of state action diminish. Errors, malevolence, and experimentation at the legal boundary all become less expensive. They therefore become more likely to occur. Apparent fault,
in short, can act either as a frictional tax or as an enabling subsidy,
depending on whether it is the state or a private actor who must demonstrate fault to elicit judicial action. What empowers in one moment
weakens in another.
Consider first that the superficial doctrinal symmetry in the case law
that we mapped above can be peeled away to reveal a functional dichotomy. In both the constitutional remedies and the substantive criminal
law contexts, apparent fault works as a prerequisite to a judicial finding
that the status quo can be disturbed. Yet this formal symmetry across
doctrinal domains is accompanied by an important difference in the
identity of the party laboring under the fault requirement: In the criminal law context, it is the federal government that seeks to alter the status
quo through a judicial proceeding to the detriment of an individual. In
the constitutional remedies context, it is a private individual (generally)
who seeks the benefit of a judicial intervention to the detriment of the
government.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
276 We emphasize that our argument is not empirical; we make no claim, as a result, about the
magnitude of the effects identified here. Testing the effect of the fault rule is possible — for example,
using a regression discontinuity design around an appropriate exogenous judicial shock — but is
beyond our ambit here: our aim is more modestly to sketch the basic hydraulics of judicial influence
on state power.
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Depending on whether it is allocated to the government or to its opponents, the fault requirement can therefore operate as a friction or an
accelerant for state action. The basic intuition here — that judicial regulation in the public law domain can act as either a tax or a subsidy —
derives from a series of justifiably famous articles by Professor William
Stuntz.277 By making certain actions either more or less costly at the
margin, judges either suppress existing behaviors or elicit new kinds of
conduct. For example, Stuntz argued that the availability of the exclusionary rule would alter the mix of claims that criminal defense lawyers,
faced with limited resources, would raise on behalf of their clients.278
He hence predicted that exclusion motions would crowd out motions
related to factual innocence in ways that, across the whole population,
benefited the guilty (who gain from exclusion) over the innocent (who
usually do not).279 So here, a judicial decision as to whether fault should
be required before a criminal penalty or a civil sanction can be imposed
changes the likelihood of that sanction being imposed.
Stuntz’s claim that friction-inducing regulation leads to a reduction
in governmental activity levels, however, contains hidden premises. It
assumes that officials are sensitive to regulatory costs imposed by judicial fiat. It also assumes that their activity levels are sensitive to (that
is, elastic to) the level of litigation-related costs.280 We think these assumptions are correct. But they need some justification as applied here.
Our claim that apparent fault operates as a tax on government behavior concerns federal prosecutors (on the criminal law side) and a wide
range of police, prison officials, and bureaucrats (on the constitutional
remedies side). This claim builds on the assumption that when officials
seek to act upon their legal authority, either by prosecuting or using
coercive force, they are sensitive to the frictional costs imposed by fault.
Prosecutors, we assume, are sensitive to the risk of acquittal. Streetlevel officials, the modal defendants in actions for constitutional remedies, are treated as being sensitive to the downstream litigation risk. But
are these assumptions justified?
We think they are. Across this range of public officials, a mixture of
motives — including concerns about effective policy implementation,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
277 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780,
782 (2006); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1275–76 (1999) (describing Fourth Amendment rules as “taxes” that shape police behavior, id. at 1275).
278 William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 443, 443–44 (1997).
279 Id. at 444 (“[Exclusion] litigation is displacing something else, and the something else may
well have more to do with guilt and innocence.”).
280 The standard view in law and economics is that negligence liability in accident law does not
influence activity levels, whereas strict liability does. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–3 (1980).
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fiscal cost, and the personal expenditure of time and effort — all likely
have an effect.281 Empirical evidence suggests that prosecutors select
cases in order to pursue policy metrics (such as sentence length or crime
reduction) keyed to career advancement.282 But prosecutors also exercise discretion among cases on the basis of judgments about when there
is sufficient evidence to proceed to trial.283
The case for treating street-level bureaucrats as sensitive to litigationrelated costs is more complex. Both evidence284 and theory285 suggest
that bureaucrats are insensitive to financial penalties. In addition, some
remedies, such as postconviction relief at the end of a habeas proceeding,
may come so long after a criminal trial that incentive effects dissipate
(except in high-profile and capital cases). But officials also have preferences over policy outcomes that work independent of deterrence-related
effects. There is some evidence, for example, that police have more punitive preferences than the general population,286 making the prospect
of downstream exclusion an unhappy one for them. It would seem likely
that prison officials also have strong preferences for order and safety in
their workplaces. And it also seems likely that many bureaucrats identify to some extent with their organizations’ missions as a consequence

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
281 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 920 (2005) (“Government officials will have a predictable array of interests . . . including
effectuating their preferred policies, contributing to the success of their political party, seeking
greater personal influence within their institution, and angling for higher office.”).
282 Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys,
7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379, 379 (2005) (finding that “the length of prison sentences is positively
related to subsequent favorable career outcomes for U.S. attorneys”); Edward L. Glaeser et al.,
What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 259, 259 (2000) (finding evidence that crime reduction is a motive).
283 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1252–54 (2011)
(“[A] prosecutor [may have] sufficient evidence to secure a conviction against a defendant for conduct that violates a criminal law, but decline[] prosecution . . . .” Id. at 1252.); see also Josh Bowers,
Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1655, 1657 (2010) (“[A] prosecutor may decide not to charge because (i) she feels she may lack
sufficient proof of legal guilt, (ii) she wishes to preserve limited resources, or (iii) she concludes that
the prospective defendant is insufficiently blameworthy.”).
284 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (finding that
fewer than one half of one percent of police defendants in a study of forty-four major jurisdictions
made any personal contribution to damages awards).
285 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 354–57 (2000) (rejecting the proposition that government
litigants are guided by financial incentives).
286 See Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police?
Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 112–14 (2016)
(summarizing studies).
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of “organizational socialization,”287 which results in a form of “institutional loyalty.”288 Tort and habeas litigation, moreover, impose nonpecuniary costs upon defendants related to lost time and damaged reputation, which might well be viewed in expectation as undesirable.289 So
while we are reluctant to draw strong conclusions about the magnitude
of fault’s effect on official behavior, we think that Stuntz’s model of
judicial regulation as tax and subsidy generates useful purchase in both
the contexts we consider.
B. The Uneven Distribution of Apparent Fault
It is not enough to point out, however, that apparent fault operates
as a tax or subsidy on government action. To fully assess its consequences on the operation of state power, it is necessary to also take into
account variations in the size of the tax or subsidy it imposes. And we
must account for limitations on its scope. It is only by doing so that one
can properly understand how apparent fault pushes and pulls, redirecting state resources by making certain actions more or less costly than
others.
This and the next section map these incentive effects. To this end,
we first explore the significant variation in the difficulty of establishing
apparent fault in different cases; we then identify the doctrinal gaps
where the federal courts have failed to deploy fault in the substantive
criminal law context and the constitutional remedies context respectively. Finally, we provide a simple framework for capturing the underlying pattern of transsubstantive regularities and analyze the effects of
apparent fault on different groups of defendants.
1. Differences in the Size of the Apparent Fault Tax. — Although up
until now we have discussed apparent fault as if it were a singular phenomenon, in practice there can be no doubt that apparent fault is easier
to establish in certain kinds of cases than in others, and with respect to
certain kinds of defendants. This is because defendants who travel in
respectable social and professional worlds generally receive from the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
287 Daniel Carpenter & George A. Krause, Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics, 25
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 13 (2014); see also JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 3
(1999) (summarizing historical research that shows the influence of “the bureaucrat’s own preferences, peer bureaucrats, supervisors, and the bureaucrat’s clients” on agency work decisions).
288 David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2018).
289 The Court has obliquely referenced this concern. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 816 (1982) (noting the “special costs to ‘subjective’ inquiries”); see also Mark R. Brown, The
Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?, 79 IOWA L. REV. 273, 309 (1994) (“[A]
general fear of litigation costs (for instance, attorneys’ fees and time) might support concerns about
overdeterrence.”); Harold J. Krent, Essay, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039,
2061–62 (1993) (“[B]ecause decisionmakers do not know which decisions will be challenged, they
must consider the possibility of a lawsuit in every case.”).
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Court a presumption of good faith that the government must specifically
overcome in order to establish the existence of fault. The same is not
true of defendants who circulate in more obviously criminal social and
professional circles.
Consider drug possession cases. Possession is one of the most numerically significant narcotics offenses.290 Possession of contraband was
identified by Professor Francis Sayre as an archetypal “public welfare”
offense.291 Yet, under federal law, as well as in most states, the government has the burden of proving the defendant’s knowledge of what he
or she possessed.292 This mens rea requirement is easily understood as
related to the apparent fault rule — at least if we assume, as proponents
of the drug laws clearly do, that possession of illicit drugs is not only an
unlawful but also an immoral act and one that betrays the possessor’s
degraded or vicious character.293 It is nevertheless a requirement that
is relatively easy for prosecutors to satisfy. Indeed, courts generally presume the defendant knew what he or she possessed, unless provided
evidence that establishes otherwise, and defendants can be held liable
for possession of illegal narcotics when found with those drugs on their
person, close to their person, or on property that they control.294 This
is why, in practice, drug possession has been said to resemble a strict
liability crime.295
Now contrast this burden of proof with what the government has to
prove in cases involving other kinds of possession crimes. Consider, for
example, the standard of proof that governs charges brought under the
National Firearms Act after the Court’s decision in Staples v. United
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
290 Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law,
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 834–36 (2001) (describing the pervasiveness of possession
offenses in both narcotics enforcement and criminal law enforcement more generally).
291 Sayre, supra note 68, at 78 (listing several forms of contraband possession as quintessential
public welfare offenses).
292 See, e.g., United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 294 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Sean Mullins,
Comment, Innocent Until Presumed Guilty: Florida’s Mistreatment of Mens Rea and the Presumption of Innocence in Drug Possession Cases, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1157, 1162 & n.27 (2013)
(noting that Florida is “one of only two states to define felony drug possession as a strict liability
crime,” id. at 1162, and that knowledge is required by all but one other).
293 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 17 (1989),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/119466.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T55-BJQL] (“[W]e declare
clearly and emphatically that there is no such thing as innocent drug use.”).
294 See, e.g., Verners, 53 F.3d at 294.
295 Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Drug Inadmissibility, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 167 (2008)
(“The criminal law has evolved so that possession is now typically a strict liability crime in which
mere presence in a location where there are drugs is sufficient to prove constructive possession, and
there are no meaningful defenses to a charge of possession.” (citing MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 32–39 (2002))); see also Dubber, supra note 290, at 859 (“In many
cases, possession statutes . . . save prosecutors the trouble of proving . . . mens rea . . . . This means
that many possession statutes, particularly in the drug area[,] . . . are so-called strict liability
crimes.”).
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States. In these cases, the government must prove not only that the
defendant possessed the illegal weapon in question. It must also affirmatively prove that the defendant knew the weapon possessed the features that made it unlawful under the Act.296 This is a much more
difficult standard to satisfy. This distinction reflects the different status
of the activity charged in each case. On the Court’s view, there are
simply fewer respectable reasons to possess a highly controlled substance
such as marijuana or cocaine than there are reasons to have firearms
like the converted automatic machine gun at issue in Staples.297
The comparison between drug and firearm possession cases underscores a more general point. Apparent fault is harder to establish in
cases in which the bare fact of the underlying conduct is not viewed by
the Justices as evidence of a vicious will of some sort. In such cases, the
government must prove that the defendant knew not only all the facts
that made his or her actions criminal but also that his or her actions
violated the law. This principle illuminates Liparota. It is also at work
in the subsequent case of Ratzlaf v. United States,298 which involved a
federal statute prohibiting the willful structuring of financial transactions to evade reporting requirements.299 To establish liability, the
Ratzlaf Court held, what the government had to show was not only that
the defendant intentionally “structured cash transactions . . . with
knowledge of, and a purpose to avoid, the banks’ duty to report currency
transactions in excess of $10,000”300 but that the defendant also knew
that structuring his transactions for this end constituted a crime.301 The
Court did so because it found there to be innocent, nonnefarious reasons
why individuals might attempt to structure their financial transactions
in this way.302 Ratzlaf and Liparota show how concern about innocent,
faultless defendants can override the maxim that ignorance of the law
is no excuse.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
296
297

See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994).
See id. at 611 (reasoning that knowledge of the weapon’s characteristics is required because
“[e]ven dangerous items can, in some cases, be so commonplace and generally available that we
would not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of strict regulation . . . [and] despite
their potential for harm, guns generally can be owned in perfect innocence”).
298 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
299 Id. at 136.
300 Id. at 140.
301 Id. at 149.
302 Id. at 144–46 (“Undoubtedly there are bad men who attempt to elude official reporting requirements in order to hide from Government inspectors such criminal activity as laundering drug
money or tax evasion. But currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious. . . . Courts have noted
‘many occasions’ on which persons, without violating any law, may structure transactions ‘in order
to avoid the impact of some regulation or tax.’ . . . In light of these examples, we are unpersuaded
by the argument that structuring is so obviously ‘evil’ or inherently ‘bad’ that the ‘willfulness’
requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant’s knowledge of the illegality of structuring.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Aversa, 762 F. Supp. 441, 446 (D.N.H. 1991))).
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Conversely, in cases in which the defendant’s underlying conduct is
obviously immoral as well as unlawful, the concerns animating judicial
demands for apparent fault ebb. The Court has hence held that, in
order to impose a ten-year minimum sentencing enhancement for discharging a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, the government does
not have to show that the firearm was discharged either knowingly or
intentionally.303 “It is unusual,” the Court explained, “to impose criminal punishment for the consequences of purely accidental conduct. But
it is not unusual to punish individuals for the unintended consequences
of their unlawful acts.”304 Because the underlying conduct the defendant
was engaged in when he discharged the gun was not only illegal but
obviously and perniciously so, the Court declined to require any further
evidence of mens rea to impose the sentencing enhancement.
An important caveat to this analysis concerns magnitudes: prosecutors already have incentives to target low-status defendants who lack
effective counsel. Empirical evidence suggests that prosecutors also
charge racial minorities more harshly than whites for comparable offenses.305 Given these headwinds, it is quite plausible to think that the
asymmetries we identify here would exist even without the apparent
fault regimes — although for reasons we explore in Part IV, extant disparities and the apparent fault demand likely emerge from the same
sociocultural and ideological matrix.
2. The Gappiness of Fault. — It is also the case that, notwithstanding
the Court’s assiduous concern with the problem of innocent defendants,
there remain significant areas of federal criminal and constitutional law
in which fault is not the governing liability standard. The gaps in the
apparent fault regime are perhaps broadest in the domain of federal
criminal law, for all the reasons canvassed in section II.B. The statutory
regimes in which fault is not elicited remain quite varied. Defendants
can be convicted of a variety of environmental crimes without any proof
of fault.306 The FDCA and similar regulatory statutes also continue to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
303
304
305

Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 577 (2009).
Id. at 575.
Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2013) (“[W]hile a black-white
gap appears to be introduced during the criminal justice process, it appears to stem largely from
prosecutors’ charging choices, especially decisions to charge defendants with ‘mandatory minimum’
offenses.”).
306 See, e.g., United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 681–82 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act requires only proof that defendants’ actions proximately harmed
protected birds); United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016, 1018–19 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding conviction under the Endangered Species Act even though government did not prove that defendant
knew that the animal in question was a threatened species or that it was illegal to transport it into
the United States).
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be construed to impose liability free from fault, even vicariously.307 And
it remains the case today that, under federal (as well as state) law, defendants can be held liable for crimes carried out by their co-conspirators that
they neither intended nor knew anything about.308
In constitutional remedies cases, the triumph of apparent fault has
been similarly incomplete. Not all constitutional challenges require a
showing of fault to succeed. This is the case for two primary reasons.
First, not all venues for making constitutional arguments are hedged
about with a demand for apparent fault. Litigants do not, for example,
have to show fault in order to challenge the constitutionality of a plea
bargain, or to overturn the results of a trial that violated their constitutional rights, so long as they are able to do so on direct appeal. Before
a conviction is final, an appellate court can provide a remedy for constitutional error, provided that the error is not “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”309 These constitutional errors, furthermore, frequently
do not require any showing that those who committed them did so
knowingly or intentionally.310 In effect, this is a no-fault standard. It
contrasts starkly with the high hurdle that confronts habeas petitioners.311
Of course, not all individual rights holders have equal access to such
venues. Whether a litigant is able to challenge constitutional errors
committed during plea bargaining or trial on direct appeal will frequently depend on whether his or her trial lawyer was able to identify
the error and challenge it immediately. In other words, the difference
in access to a constitutional remedy will frequently depend on whether
a litigant has a good lawyer.312 To the extent that access to competent
legal advice is correlated with wealth and income, apparent fault is imposed in a regressive fashion.
Second, the rise of apparent fault has not impacted nonindividualized constitutional remedies. It has thus not made it harder to facially

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
307 Amy J. Sepinwall, Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law, 40 J. CORP. L. 439,
475 (2015).
308 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 789 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2015) (co-conspirator can be
liable for possessing a weapon found in conspirators’ car even if he did not place it there or know
of its existence); United States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 739–43 (7th Cir. 2014) (defendant can be
liable for drugs sold by co-conspirators).
309 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
310 The government, for example, may violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by
providing ineffective assistance of counsel when it furnishes a lawyer whose performance falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” even if it does so with no bad intent. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
311 See supra pp. 1552–53.
312 That said, ineffective assistance of counsel at trial — if it can be documented — provides a
gateway to habeas review on the merits. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54 (1991).
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challenge federal laws on constitutional grounds. Notionally, facial challenges on constitutional grounds are “disfavored.”313 Yet, as a practical
matter, successful facial challenges to statutes on constitutional
grounds — and in particular structural constitutional grounds —
abound.314 In these challenges, and through mechanisms such as the
Declaratory Judgment Act, “federal courts frequently entertain actions
for injunctions and for declaratory relief aimed at preventing future activities that are reasonably likely or highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place.”315 Nationwide injunctions against nascent programs ensue.316 Such constitutional review in federal court, in effect,
operates as a functional parallel to the “abstract” judicial review of legislation immediately after enactment exercised by the French Conseil
Constitutionnel.317 The apparent fault requirement does not generally
apply to such quasi-anticipatory challenges.318 Other potential constraints, such as Article III standing limitations, are also applied not
infrequently with a light touch.319
In some contexts, the Court’s concern with fault has only made it
easier to bring certain kinds of facial challenges. For example, although
the Court has insisted that bad intent is necessary to establish a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause,320 it also applies a categorical presumption that laws or practices that classify on the basis of race or some other
“suspect” characteristic are the product of a bad intent.321 The result
has been to relieve litigants seeking to challenge laws that employ racial
or other suspect classifications of the onerous burden imposed on litigants who seek to challenge facially neutral laws.
Note the striking contrast between the kind of plaintiff burdened by
apparent fault and the pool of litigants able to avail themselves of quasi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
313 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 398 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008));
accord Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006).
314 In recent Terms, these have included Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076,
2096 (2015); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2013); Bond v.
United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222–24 (2011); and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 497–98 (2010).
315 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 431 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
316 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146, 188 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
317 For a summary of this system, see Alec Stone Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in
France and Europe, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 69, 71 (2007).
318 The exception, of course, involves challenges predicated on the Equal Protection Clause or
some other constitutional provision that has been interpreted to require a showing of fault. See,
e.g., Hawai‘i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1236 (D. Haw. 2017) (citing “religious animus” in
finding a likely Establishment Clause violation), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 859 F.3d 741 (9th
Cir. 2017), vacated on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017). But see infra note 321 and accompanying
text.
319 See Huq, supra note 24, at 65 & n.343 (collecting cases).
320 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
321 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (applying strict scrutiny
to a public university’s use of race in admissions for diversity ends).
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anticipatory challenges to abstract policies that are often still awaiting
full implementation. The latter does not include dispersed, relatively
politically disempowered rights bearers, such as criminal defendants, the
convicted, and the objects of police surveillance or violence. It is more
likely to include sophisticated, fiscally endowed interest groups, such as
industry groups, state-level politicians, and wealthy criminal defendants.
The resulting latticework of fault’s application is summarized in
Table 1.
Table 1: The Uneven Application of Apparent Fault

Apparent
Fault
Required

Criminal Law

Constitutional Law

Acts involving “apparently
innocent” conduct, such as
meeting with constituents
and possessing handguns

Individual remedies
(§ 1983, Bivens, habeas,
and exclusion)
Certain substantive
constitutional norms
(subsidy)

Apparent
Fault Not
Required

Acts growing out of
criminal agreement or
criminal intent

Facial challenges to statutes

Criminal actions that result
from participation in grey
markets

Structural challenges

C. The Distributive Consequences of Apparent Fault
As the previous section indicates, the operation of the apparent fault
rule is likely to have relatively predictable distributive effects. In this
section, we map them out. Our aim is to identify roughly how its costs
and benefits fall upon different forms of state action, and to suggest how
these costs and benefits alter the distribution and form of state action
observed in the world.
We begin by characterizing the effect of including or omitting apparent fault in the federal criminal law and constitutional law contexts we
have identified in Part II. Table 2, which tracks the basic conceptual
template of Table 1, summarizes the doctrine’s effect upon federal officials’ incentives to engage in state action.
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Table 2: The Distributive Effects of Apparent Fault on State Action
Criminal Law

Constitutional Law

Apparent
Fault
Required

Antistatist

Statist

Apparent
Fault Not
Required

Statist

Antistatist

Given these general effects, it is possible to characterize in broad
strokes the general distributive effect of fault across the incentives of the
federal government. At the most general level, apparent fault’s emergence across some (but not all) aspects of federal governmental action
imposes pressure to shift state resources away from the enforcement of
complex, generally white-collar and regulatory offenses, and toward the
direct, physical enforcement of law in arenas such as narcotics and
immigration.
As Part II demonstrated, the Supreme Court has imposed supplemental mens rea requirements in the antitrust, securities, and public
corruption contexts as a means of protecting “innocent” conduct.322
Concern for apparent fault, to be sure, is by no means pervasive across
white-collar crimes.323 But the examples identified in Part II are hardly
insignificant. Nor have the courts of appeals ignored the Court’s signal.
One high-profile example is worth recounting despite our focus on the
Supreme Court: the criminal and civil suit against Countrywide Home
Loans executives for mortgage-related fraud during the financial crisis
of 2008–2009 based on alleged violations of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.324 The Second Circuit
vacated a jury’s verdict for the government with instructions to enter
judgment for the corporate officer defendants because the prosecution
had failed to produce sufficient evidence of intent.325 It explained that
“where allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations are promises made in a
contract, a party claiming fraud must prove fraudulent intent at the time
of contract execution,” and “evidence of a subsequent, willful breach
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
322
323

See supra pp. 1558–64.
Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 843 (2014)
(arguing that federal corporate criminal law “often dispense[s] with mens rea”).
324 United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 652 (2d Cir.
2016).
325 Id. at 652–53.
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cannot sustain the claim.”326 This ruling deflates the likelihood of further prosecutions. Even where a financial institution such as a mortgage
provider engages in deliberate fraud, it will be exceedingly difficult to
find evidence of that mens rea memorialized contemporaneously with
the relevant deal.327 And the ruling created this effect out of a concern
that the “innocent” conduct of contract breach will be mistaken for criminal conduct — precisely the concern animating the demand for apparent fault.
Whereas the white-collar activities of business and government have
prompted courts to erect some prophylactic safeguards in the form of
fault demands, the more blue-collar (or no-collar) activities of street
crime and other activities associated with the “off the books” economy
have not elicited analogous judicial solicitude.328 In very rough terms,
the sociologist Professor John Hagan’s juxtaposition between “the financial crimes of the suites” and “the common crimes of the streets”329 is a
useful summary of the two categories across which the fault rule has
asymmetrical incentive effects.
These incentive effects play out within U.S. Attorney’s offices, and
also between federal and state law enforcement efforts. To begin with,
federal prosecutorial priorities vary widely between U.S. Attorney’s offices depending on local circumstances.330 While U.S. Attorneys certainly target complex forms of financial crimes, international offenses,
and collective culpability, the uneven weight of apparent fault demands
across federal criminal law creates an incentive for a U.S. Attorney to
substitute between different kinds of cases. It means that the expected
return from many species of white-collar prosecution is tamped down.
But no kindred dampening effect obtains when the street-level crimes
are targeted. The net effect of apparent fault as presently articulated is
to channel enforcement and prosecution resources away from whitecollar and toward street crime. Beyond this intraoffice effect, there is
an interjurisdictional effect. Despite an increasing level of federal involvement,331 it is still state and local authorities who deal “overwhelmingly [with] traditional ‘index’ or street crimes — violence, property, and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
326
327

Id. at 658.
Sara Sun Beale, The Development and Evolution of the U.S. Law of Corporate Criminal Liability and the Yates Memo, 46 STETSON L. REV. 41, 67 (2016) (highlighting the Second Circuit’s
reversal as “demonstrat[ing] just how hard it might be to impose criminal liability”).
328 SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF
THE URBAN POOR 11–12 (2006) (describing the scope of this “underground economy,” id. at 11).
329 JOHN HAGAN, WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS? 2 (2010).
330 Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 802, 854 (2015) (noting “large disparities among the . . . U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in terms of
what cases are prosecuted, what kinds of plea agreements are offered, and whether prosecutors
move for departures under the Sentencing Guidelines”).
331 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 523–26 (2011).

2018]

APPARENT FAULT

1577

drug crimes, plus traffic offenses.”332 A demand for apparent fault imposes little burden on their ability to prosecute these crimes.
These incentive effects are reinforced by the operation of the fault
rule in the constitutional remedies context. Here, the apparent fault rule
renders prosecution less costly across the board as a regulatory strategy:
government attorneys need spend less effort anticipating and countering
exclusion motions or insulating convictions from postconviction review.
Perhaps a more significant effect, though, concerns the frontline state
and federal officials charged with applying physical coercion on the
ground. It is in the dispersed, decentralized deployment of discretionary
coercion by police, border patrols, prison staff, and other state agents
that the fault-related limits on constitutional tort, Fourth Amendment
exclusion, and retail unconstitutional discrimination have the most bite.
For this class of state actors, the knowledge that “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”333 can disregard
constitutional liability likely has a large effect on incentives for legal
compliance.
In contrast, legislators and agency officials engaged in the crafting of
first-order regulation have no such assurance. They must anticipate not
only the full force of constitutional limits but also the possibility of preenforcement challenges adjudicated without the benefit of a factual record of how a legal measure operates on the ground.334 Therefore, to
the extent that government decisionmakers are debating whether to deal
with a social problem through a new civil regulatory framework or
through on-the-ground coercive intervention, the fault rule in constitutional remedies pushes toward the latter. This likely has the marginal
effect of blunting legislative incentives to enact new criminal measures
in regulatory domains where white-collar prosecutors operate, while increasing the returns from enactment of new street-level criminal regulation. As a result, it is in the same “street” context that federal action is
liberated by the demand for apparent fault from government actors in
constitutional remedies cases, and the same “suites” context where a demand for apparent fault from criminal defendants means that the state
remains subject to potentially disabling frictions.
The markedly uneven consequences of the Court’s embrace of apparent fault on differently positioned defendants, we should note, were
neither inevitable nor natural. We have repeatedly stressed that apparent fault hinges on a contestable normative judgment by the Justices
about what counts as a violation of social understandings of legality. We
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
332 Darryl K. Brown, The Distribution of Fraud Enforcement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1593, 1594
(2007).
333 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)).
334 See supra note 314 (collecting examples of facial constitutional challenges of statutes).
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have carefully avoided any suggestion that the doctrine constrains judicial discretion in making that judgment. To the contrary, we think that
the observed judgments of apparent fault catalogued in Part II might
well be sharply contested on normative grounds. But our purpose here
is not to give an alternative account of apparent fault “done right.” It
is rather to show how it works as a vessel into which judicial preferences
and perspectives can be poured.
Alternatively, the Court could have switched out apparent fault in
favor of a different screening rule with distinct distributive effects. In
the criminal law context, for example, the Court could have embraced
instead a fault principle akin to that advocated by the drafters of the
MPC. It could have insisted that, at minimum, recklessness must be
proven with respect to each element of any criminal offense. Such a
rule would have significantly limited the government’s ability to prosecute those involved in street crime as well as those involved in the crime
of the suites. However, although liberal members of the Court have at
times hinted at such a rule,335 it is not a conception of fault that now
orients federal criminal law.
Other trajectories can be imagined. For example, the Court could
have interpreted the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments as limits on the government’s ability to impose liability on
defendants who had no reasonable opportunity to conform their conduct
to the requirements of the law. For example, careful ethnographic work
in highly impoverished, urban, and racially segregated communities by
sociologists such as Professor Sudhir Venkatesh, Professor Mary Pattillo,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
335 In his majority opinion in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), Justice
Breyer proposed a general rule of statutory interpretation that, when a statute requires that a defendant act “knowingly,” courts should interpret it to require proof of knowledge with respect to
each element of the crime. Id. at 650. Justice Breyer’s rule acknowledges no distinctions based on
the innocent or not-so-innocent nature of the underlying conduct. Three members of the Court
concurred specifically to register their disapproval of this portion of the majority opinion. See id.
at 657–59 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id.
at 659–61 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito warned that
Justice Breyer’s suggestion could lead to an “overly rigid rule of statutory construction,” id. at 659,
and eliminate strict liability where it was unproblematic. Id. at 659–60. In the nine years since
Flores-Figueroa was decided, there is no evidence that Justice Breyer’s approach has been widely
adopted by the lower courts. Instead, courts continue to interpret statutes that require proof of
some kind of culpable intent on the defendant’s part to require proof of that intent with respect to
only some, or even one, of the elements of the crime when doing so does not risk imposing liability
on the apparently innocent. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 827 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 2016)
(construing federal law making it a crime to threaten a federal officer to not require proof of
knowledge that the victim was a federal officer because requiring intent to threaten is sufficient to
separate “‘wrongful conduct’ from innocent conduct”); United States v. Allen, 788 F.3d 61, 69–70
(2d Cir. 2015) (holding that federal law prohibiting the burning of federal lands does not require
proof that defendant knew the lands were federal because “[a]rson is hardly ‘otherwise innocent
conduct,’” id. at 69 (quoting United States v. LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1994))).
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and others points toward the thorough entangling of licit and illicit livelihoods and practices in these communities,336 which are often racially
homogenous.337 Exit, moreover, is not costless, since even middle-class
African American communities “continue to be unique in the degree to
which they are spatially linked with communities of severe concentrated
disadvantage.”338 Again, African American middle-class families face
especially acute challenges in separating themselves from illicit networks even after they flee blighted urban areas for suburbs or exurbs.339
Accounting for such background facts, one could imagine a series of
post-Lambert decisions in which courts analyzed the hazardous and
stressful conditions of impoverishment and violence in which much urban street crime occurs and developed a set of mens rea rules that accounted for the difficulties faced by those most often subject to narcotics
or immigration enforcement.
The federal bench, however, has evinced no such empathy or compassion. Instead, in closely analogous fact situations, courts have generally refused to find that the imposition of criminal liability absent fault
violates the Due Process Clause. They have deflected due process challenges to sex offender registration laws that make a convicted sex offender’s failure to register a strict liability offense.340 In the civil context,
courts have rejected due process challenges to laws that allow the eviction from public housing of tenants whose guests or family members
engage in drug-related criminal activity without those tenants’
knowledge or control.341
The result of apparent fault’s rise has thus been to make it easier for
the state to punish certain kinds and classes of crimes than others. It
has engendered a web of doctrinal rules that at the margin make it more
difficult for the government to criminally regulate white-collar activities
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
336 See ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY 141–62
(2014) (describing illegal side businesses in a poor Philadelphia neighborhood); VENKATESH, supra
note 328, at 10 (noting the “interpenetration of outlawed and legitimate ways of making money”).
337 Douglas S. Massey & Jonathan Tannen, A Research Note on Trends in Black Hypersegregation, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1025, 1027 (2015) (“Over the period from 1970 to 2010, 52 metropolitan
areas satisfied the criteria for black hypersegregation at one point or another.”).
338 Patrick Sharkey, Spatial Segmentation and the Black Middle Class, 119 AM. J. SOC. 903, 905–
06 (2014).
339 MARY PATTILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG
THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 36–42 (1999) (developing this point through an analysis of a Chicago
neighborhood described under the pseudonym “Groveland”).
340 See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that federal
sex offender registration law did not require proof that defendant knew of his obligations under the
law to register); see also Morrow v. State, 452 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Ark. 2014) (upholding constitutionality
of Arkansas sex offender law).
341 See, e.g., Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135–36 (2002) (rejecting lower
court conclusion that federal policy “‘raise[d] serious questions under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,’ because it permit[ted] ‘tenants to be deprived of their property interest
without any relationship to individual wrongdoing,’” id. at 135 (quoting Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d
1113, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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and the activities of those otherwise deemed to be respectable than it is
to regulate the activities of lower-status, often minority, actors who live
in close proximity to the border between the formal and informal economies. For these reasons, we think it would be too quick to suggest that
fault and its kin necessarily operate as frictions on state power: what we
have described is not a story of constraint but a tale of how state coercion has been reallocated from some populations to others.
IV. APPARENT FAULT IN HISTORICAL
AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT
The emergence of judicial demands for apparent fault observed in
the doctrine calls for explanation: Why have so many judges, arrayed
across time, converged on a substantially parallel conception of fault as
an instrument for titrating coercive state resources in a variety of federal
law domains? And why have they done so with the particular distributional consequences we have charted? This Part offers, if not a causal
account, then a tentative diagnosis. We develop first an account of the
political context in which demands for apparent fault arose. We then
explore the deep-rooted assumptions and larger intellectual formations
at work under its surface. Such external, contextualizing analyses of
apparent fault are, in our view, necessary because explanations derived
from the jurisprudence’s internal logic are so manifestly deficient.
A. What Doesn’t Explain Apparent Fault
The Court has made a number of arguments to justify the increasing
concern with fault in its constitutional remedies and criminal law cases.
None of these arguments, however, provides a very persuasive explanation for the turn to apparent fault.
First, there is the argument that a fault rule is necessary to avoid
overdeterring socially beneficial behavior. As we saw in Part II, in its
qualified immunity cases, the Court has argued that a fault rule is necessary to allow the “vigorous exercise of official authority.”342 In other
remedial contexts, the Court has also argued that allowing relief absent
a showing of fault would chill “objectively reasonable” state action.343
The Court has made similar arguments in its criminal law cases. In
U.S. Gypsum Co., for example, it argued that criminal intent had to be
read into the Sherman Act to prevent businessmen from avoiding “salutary and procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct.”344 Similarly, in McDonnell, the Court justified its
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
342 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506
(1978)).
343 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984); see also id. at 919–21.
344 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978).
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narrow reading of federal anticorruption law by invoking the risk that
a broader reading might “chill federal officials’ interactions with the
people they serve and thus damage their ability effectively to perform
their duties.”345 In all these contexts, the Court has suggested that a
fault rule provides government officials or private citizens the security
they need to engage in beneficial, but risky, behavior.
On its face, this argument may seem reasonable enough. But as one
of us has previously pointed out about the constitutional remedies cases,
the Court has provided no empirical evidence to substantiate its concerns.346 It has provided no evidence, for example, that overdeterrence
is a problem in any given domain that judicial doctrine needs to address.347 Nor has it provided any evidence showing that the overdeterrence costs that might be created by a more expansive criminal or civil
liability regime outweigh the underdeterrence costs created by a regime
in which individuals can escape liability for harmful acts that are not
sufficiently egregious to satisfy the demand for apparent fault.348 This
absence is particularly striking in the constitutional remedies cases,
where the Court’s effort to avoid criminalizing “objectively reasonable”
behavior has meant that a considerable amount of plainly illegal, inefficient, and even malevolent state action can proceed without remedy.349
Yet it is also noticeable in the criminal law cases, where the restrictive
interpretation of federal criminal laws can have considerable costs.350
The Court’s failure to even try to weigh the costs and benefits that
may flow from alternative regimes of liability not only makes the overdeterrence argument hard to evaluate but also makes it difficult to believe that the concern with overdeterrence was solely, or even primarily,
responsible for the Court’s turn to fault. Rather than a rational effort
to avoid creating unnecessary costs, the Court’s embrace of an apparent
fault rule appears to reflect instead an optimistic judgment that most
officials wielding state power — and certain kinds of criminal defendants — will be well-intentioned. But what grounds that belief? Nothing in the cases does.
Second, there is the argument that a fault rule is necessary for judicial economy reasons. In its constitutional remedies cases, the Court has
argued that requiring evidence of some sort of fault is necessary to limit
the volume or scope of federal-court interference in “the routine day-to–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
345 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016) (quoting Brief of Former Federal
Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474)).
346 Huq, supra note 24, at 23–25.
347 Id. at 24.
348 See Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases,
57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 637–38 (1982).
349 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 734 (2011); supra pp. 1551–52.
350 See, e.g., Eisler, supra note 26, at 1648–51 (discussing the serious systemic consequences that
may flow from the Court’s restrictive interpretation of federal anticorruption law in McDonnell).
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day administration of state government.”351 Commentators have made
similar arguments to defend the Court’s focus on fault in its criminal
law cases. They have argued, for example, that the Court’s newfound
focus on mens rea is an aversive response to the growth of the regulatory
state.352
It is certainly the case that concerns about judicial economy explain
some of the developments we describe in Part II. They help explain, for
example, the Court’s efforts to limit the availability of constitutional
remedies.353 But a concern with judicial economy cannot explain all of
the developments we describe. It cannot explain, for example, why the
Court has embraced a fault rule that leaves federal as well as state prosecutors with such wide latitude to rack up large volumes of criminal
convictions in narcotics and immigration cases — in cases, that is, where
fault is extremely easy to establish. If courts were in fact motivated by
docket control concerns, they would ratchet up the fault threshold in
these cases as well. That they have failed to do so, while appealing to
caseload concerns in other contexts, suggests that their perceptions of
the sources of docket pressure are mediated by some other set of normative concerns. It also makes it hard to view the Court’s embrace of an apparent fault rule as a serious response to the problem of overcriminalization.
Third, the Court has suggested that evidence of fault is required by
basic principles of justice. In Elonis, for instance, it insisted that evidence of fault was necessary to vindicate a fundamental principle of the
criminal law: namely, that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.”354 In other cases, it suggested that imposing criminal liability on
the apparently innocent would create constitutional problems akin to
those produced by the registration law the Court struck down on due
process grounds in Lambert. In Staples, it warned in this vein that extending the reach of the National Firearms Act to owners of converted
machine guns would create serious notice problems given the pervasiveness of gun ownership and the widely shared perception that owning a
gun is a “licit and blameless” act.355 In United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc.,356 the majority made a similar notice argument to justify its
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
351 Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 980 (1986).
352 See, e.g., LARKIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 8 (celebrating the Court’s focus on questions of
fault as an important response to “the problems of overcriminalization”); Singer & Husak, supra
note 25, at 861 (arguing that the turn to fault represents the Court’s “reinvigorated . . . concern with
protecting innocent persons as a bedrock of federal criminal law”).
353 Huq, supra note 24, at 58–63 (developing this argument).
354 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 252 (1952)); see also id. (asserting that the “basic principle that ‘wrongdoing must be
conscious to be criminal’ . . . is ‘as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in the
freedom of the human will’” (first quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252; then quoting id. at 250)).
355 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 613 (1994).
356 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
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demanding interpretation of the mens rea element in a federal child pornography law.357
This argument is also unsatisfying. For one thing, the Court’s insistence that courts “read into [federal] statute[s] . . . ‘that mens rea which
is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from “otherwise innocent conduct”’”358 does not always mean, in practice, that defendants must be
conscious of their wrongdoing to be held criminally liable for their, or
others’, acts.359 Whatever the virtues or the vices of the insistence on
apparent fault, the demand for apparent fault cannot therefore be justified simply by invoking “basic” and “universal” principles of justice.
Nor can the apparent fault rule be justified by invoking the constitutional concern with notice. This is because the rule creates plenty of
notice problems of its own. Consider, for example, the defendant who
sells drugs near a school without knowing that he is proximate to that
school. He has no notice of the heightened penalties that follow from
his criminal activity. Nevertheless, under the logic of apparent fault, he
can be sanctioned. If the Court were truly concerned with giving notice
to criminal actors, it would have embraced the much more restrictive
fault rule advocated by the drafters of the MPC and required evidence
that the defendant acted at least recklessly with respect to each element
of the offense. Arguments about notice, or the injustice of imposing
liability on “apparently innocent” defendants, thus provide at best a very
partial explanation for the growing role of apparent fault in federal
criminal law.
Finally, we do not think that the rise of apparent fault can be attributed to simple partisan politics. Liberal and conservative judges
alike have embraced fault as a limiting principle in constitutional as well
as criminal law. Justices from Brennan in Liparota to Roberts in
McDonnell have insisted on the importance of fault in criminal cases.
Similarly, a broad coalition of ideologically diverse judges have embraced the fault rule in habeas, exclusionary rule, and constitutional
torts cases.360 As a result, attitudinal models of the judiciary cannot
provide a comprehensive explanation for the shift we trace out in the
Court’s, as well as the lower federal courts’, public law cases.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
357 Id. at 69 (holding that a conviction for interstate trafficking of child pornography requires
knowledge of all its elements because otherwise the law “would sweep within the ambit of the
statute actors who had no idea that they were even dealing with sexually explicit material”).
358 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
359 This is true, for example, of those held liable for the criminal acts of their co-conspirators
under Pinkerton. See supra text accompanying notes 97–103.
360 Huq, supra note 24, at 47 (noting that in constitutional remedies cases “key precedent . . . is
surprisingly bereft of sharp ideological division[, and] qualified immunity and habeas precedent
include frequent supermajoritarian and even unanimous opinions”).
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B. The Political Context of Apparent Fault’s Ascent
Rather than simply a response to deterrence, cost, or justice concerns,
we think the rise of apparent fault is a product of broader political and
intellectual shifts in widely held conceptions of appropriate individual
and state responsibility, and the appropriate allocation of regulation’s
social costs. In what follows, we offer conclusions that are professedly
tentative. Determining how ideas migrate into circulation, and then become bedrock elements of the conventional wisdom among judges and
lawyers, is a tricky business. We think, however, that the enterprise of
situating broad legal developments such as the rise of apparent fault in
its political and intellectual context is a worthwhile, even necessary,
predicate for a clear understanding of federal law’s trajectory.361
We sketch first the political context in which apparent fault became
an increasingly important principle of Supreme Court doctrine. Its ascendency in the 1970s and 1980s, we suggest, corresponds to a general
shift from regulatory to punitive modes of social control. During this
period, social welfarist elements of the Great Society gave way to punitive approaches to the social problems attendant on poverty. In this
context, judicial changes in constitutional remedies doctrine made it easier to deploy the coercive instruments of the state. A subsequent deregulatory turn in American politics corresponded to the moment that apparent fault filtered into federal criminal law on the white-collar side.
Consider first the well-known punitive turn in late twentieth-century
American politics and policymaking. Its basic contours are by now familiar: Over the course of the twentieth century’s second half, both
crime rates362 and punitive attitudes among the American public363
steadily increased. Public attitudes toward crime, however, did not mechanically respond to changes in the level of criminal activity. Rather,
they lagged considerably behind.364 Partisan mobilization among political elites aimed at rendering crime salient as an object of policymaking

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
361 Cf. Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Response, What Is Criminal Law About?, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 1173, 1176–77 (2016) (describing different approaches to the intellectual history of criminal
law); Gordon, supra note 29, at 116 (describing scholarship that uses “legal historiography as the
intellectual history of the rise and fall of paradigm structures of thought designed to mediate
contradictions”).
362 GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY 20–22 (1998) (noting that reported street crime quadrupled in the twelve years from 1959 to 1971 and homicide rates doubled between 1963 and 1974);
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION — AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 2–3 (2017).
363 Peter K. Enns, The Public’s Increasing Punitiveness and Its Influence on Mass Incarceration
in the United States, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 857, 862 fig.1 (2014).
364 Joachim J. Savelsberg, Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment, 99 AM. J. SOC.
911, 919–20 (1994).
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instead played a necessary mediating role between observed crime rates
and perceptions of crime as an important object of public policy.365
One of the most consequential policy-related adjuncts of this trend
was a turn away from “the opportunity, development, and training programs of the War on Poverty” toward “the surveillance, patrol, and detention programs of . . . [the] ‘War on Crime.’”366 By the 1980s, the
latter forms of social control had almost “completely supplant[ed]” Great
Society–style antipoverty programs as a solution to urban poverty.367
Ultimately, this shifted into a broader “revolution in favor of markets
[and] . . . against intrusions by Big Government” outside the crimecontrol domain.368
Importantly, this was largely a bipartisan realignment.369 In the
1960s, Republicans employed a “mutually reinforcing” strategy of “depoliticization and criminalization of racial struggle” and a “racialization
of crime.”370 Major national media blamed the civil rights movement
not only for urban riots, but also “more generally, for lawbreaking by
‘Negroes.’”371 Rather than resisting this framing, Democrats responded
by “trying desperately to mimic” and even outbid their partisan foes.372
Democrats did not merely speak to crime fears, “they also fueled

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
365

See generally KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONAMERICAN POLITICS (1997); Dennis D. Loo & Ruth-Ellen M. Grimes, Polls, Politics, and Crime: The “Law and Order” Issue of the 1960s, 5 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 50 (2004)
(closely analyzing polling data to show that “the 1960s’ crime issue was a social construction — a
moral panic — initiated and fostered by conservative elites in an effort to counter the gains made
by the 1960s’ social insurgencies,” id. at 50).
366 Elizabeth Hinton, “A War Within Our Own Boundaries”: Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society
and the Rise of the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 100, 101 (2015); see also id. at 101–02; Katherine
Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 43, 46 (2001) (noting that the penal turn “coincided with efforts to scale back the welfare state”); Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, Guns and Butter: The
Welfare State, the Carceral State, and the Politics of Exclusion in the Postwar United States, 102
J. AM. HIST. 87, 89 (2015).
367 Hinton, supra note 366, at 111.
368 James Q. Whitman, The Free Market and the Prison, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214 (2012)
(book review).
369 Professor Nicola Lacey argues that the distinctively bilateral character of American political
competition conduces to competition over crime policy. See NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’
DILEMMA 63–67 (2008).
370 Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 230, 247 (2007); see also NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW
LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 57 (2014) (“[R]ace conservatives displaced the root of violence
onto civil rights liberalization itself.”).
371 Melissa Hickman Barlow, Race and the Problem of Crime in Time and Newsweek Cover
Stories, 1946 to 1995, 25 SOC. JUST., Summer 1998, at 149, 162 (1998); see also id. at 161–66.
372 Weaver, supra note 370, at 251.
TEMPORARY
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them.”373 By 1973, indeed, crime had crowded out civil rights as a concern in the national Democratic Party’s agenda.374 By the early 1980s,
penal and welfare regimes were tightly coupled into a “single policy regime aimed at the governance of social marginality.”375 This regime
increasingly shifted resources from socialized programs of welfare toward the individualized assignment of criminal punishment at both the
federal and state levels.376 This regime was coupled with a broader
deregulatory agenda closely associated with President Ronald
Reagan.377 But in a signal of the bipartisan nature of the resulting consensus, it was a Democratic president who promised to end welfare, and
who did so by signing a reform measure “largely written on Republican
terms.”378
One can interpret the Court’s efforts during this period to limit the
availability of constitutional remedies as consonant with this more general policy realignment. Qualified immunity doctrine, for example, is
framed in transsubstantive terms. But it developed “primarily in cases
involving law enforcement”379 at a moment in which crime “ha[d] in
some sense captured the imagination of those exercising state power.”380
It seems plausible to postulate that the specific policy context in which
immunity doctrine developed would influence the Justices’ thinking.
This context also helps explain why judicial economy concerns that bit
in the remedies context (where volume is produced by increasing state
reliance on coercion) did not register in the criminal law context (where
volume is produced by the increased penalization of private conduct).
One could conclude, then, that the ongoing turn from the Great Society to
the War on Crime influenced judicial perceptions of the relative costs of
different forms of state action, without collapsing into crude functionalism.
The Court’s embrace of apparent fault in its interpretation of federal
criminal law can be understood as part of the broader deregulatory turn
that started in the 1980s. The move to scale back government intervention in the economy, and the concomitant celebration of the unregulated
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
373 Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and
Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 729 (2010).
374 See Weaver, supra note 370, at 252.
375 Beckett & Western, supra note 366, at 55; accord Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 366, at 89.
376 Beckett & Western, supra note 366, at 53–55.
377 Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The Hard Way to Fight a Revolution,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 521 (1990) (describing President Reagan’s deregulatory agenda during the
campaign and while in office). Deregulation, though, started to dominate the political agenda under
President Carter. See id. at 524.
378 John F. Harris & John E. Yang, Clinton to Sign Bill Overhauling Welfare, WASH. POST, Aug.
1, 1996, at A01; see also BECKETT, supra note 365, at 51 (arguing that “the central premise of the
conservative project of state reconstruction[ was that] public assistance is an ‘illegitimate’ state
function, whereas policing and social control constitute its real ‘constitutional’ obligation”).
379 Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 22 (2017).
380 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 21 (2007).
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market,381 provide the context in which the Court’s growing concern
with the imposition of criminal liability on the “apparently innocent”
appears comprehensible, even inevitable. It offers one explanation for
the Court’s new sensitivity, in cases such as U.S. Gypsum Co., to the
threat that a faultless regime might chill valuable economic activity.
More generally, it helps explain why courts were increasingly unwilling
to treat crime deterrence as a sufficient justification for criminal regulation when otherwise respectable defendants were involved. In a context
in which the propriety and wisdom of state regulation were increasingly
called into question, it is easy enough to see why courts may have found
it entirely inappropriate to subject individuals who had no proven criminal intent to the very intensive regulation of the criminal law.
On the other hand, this deregulating turn occurred against a backdrop of continuing anxiety about street crime.382 This context helps
explain the many gaps in the fault regime, and why innocence came to
be defined not by the statutory particularities of crime (as the MPC
drafters wanted), but instead by something more inchoate — namely,
whether defendants knew or should have known that their actions were
subject to the criminal law. The concept of fault that the MPC drafters
urged states to adopt might have imposed significant costs on the government’s ability to prosecute ordinary criminal activity by requiring
prosecutors to prove at least recklessness with respect to each statutorily
defined element of the charged offense. The notion of apparent fault
observed in the case law, in contrast, divides defendants into roughly
the “apparently innocent” and the “facially culpable,” and therefore imposes weaker constraints on the federal and state governments’ ability
to, among other things, wage the War on Drugs. One could say, following Professor Bernard Harcourt, that apparent fault helped distinguish
two classes of citizens: those who were participants in the free market,
and therefore not properly the subject of intensive state regulation, and
those who were instead inhabitants of the “penal sphere, where [state
regulation was both] necessary and legitimate.”383
Thinking about the emergence of apparent fault in relation to these
changes in the political and economic environment also helps illuminate
the doctrine’s timing. The embrace of fault as a limiting principle in
substantive criminal law cases occurred, as Part II indicates, somewhat
later than the embrace of fault in constitutional remedies cases. This
may reflect the political dynamics involved — and specifically, the fact
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
381 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS 41 (2011) (“The punitive
society we now live in has been made possible by . . . this belief that there is a categorical difference
between the free market, where intervention is inappropriate, and the penal sphere, where it is
necessary and legitimate.”).
382 See Enns, supra note 363, at 862 fig.1. Punitive attitudes, however, vary widely by race.
Mark D. Ramirez, Punitive Sentiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 352 fig.3 (2013) (identifying lower
rates of such attitudes among racial minorities).
383 HARCOURT, supra note 381, at 41.

1588

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:1525

that it was only after the consolidation of bipartisan support for punitive
policy approaches that the “bidding war” over crime policy abated and
there was space for complaints about “innocent” defendants, whose
cause aligned politically with the deregulatory turn.
C. The Ideological Context of Apparent Fault
The fact that the apparent fault rule helped advance particular (deregulatory and punitive) policy ends does not mean, of course, that the
Court employed it purely instrumentally, as a means to those ends. Instead, what it may reflect is the influence on the Justices of the particular
set of moral and political intuitions that helped justify, and motivate,
the policy changes sketched out in the previous section. One can understand the turn to fault, in other words, as a product of the ideological
changes that helped refashion the welfare state over the second half of
the twentieth century.
Historians of the 1970s and 1980s have argued that a characteristic
feature of this period was the shift in public discourse away from the
rhetoric of collective responsibility that characterized the Great Society
era and toward the rhetoric of personal responsibility that would dominate public discourse from then until now.384 Rather than assuming that
political rights were primarily determined by the fact of one’s membership in a political community, political discourses of the period increasingly assumed that individual entitlements depended upon that individual’s choices, and particularly whether his or her choices were good or
bad.385
Conservative thinkers and politicians first promoted the idea that
the obligations the state owed its citizens depended in large part on
whether their behavior was “responsible” and challenged the idea that
the state possessed a duty to take care of those who did not take care of
themselves.386 But as liberal intellectuals and politicians picked it up,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
384 See, e.g., YASCHA MOUNK, THE AGE OF RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2017) (“Over the last thirty
years, the notion of personal responsibility has become central to our moral vocabulary, to philosophical debates about distributive justice, to our political rhetoric, and to our actual public policies.” (footnotes omitted)); DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 3–9, 127–79 (2011); Loïc
Wacquant, Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism, 20 SOC.
ANTHROPOLOGY 66, 72 (2012) (noting that “[t]he trope of individual responsibility” played an
important role in justifying the punitiveness of American criminal justice policy).
385 MOUNK, supra note 384, at 5 (“In the postwar years, there was a broad societal consensus
that many of the duties the state owes to its citizens are largely independent of the choices those
citizens have made. . . . Today, by contrast, more and more welfare commitments are conditioned
on good, or ‘responsible’ behavior.”).
386 Id. at 31–37; RODGERS, supra note 384, at 189–91, 219–20.
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the notion soon became hegemonic.387 A focus on individual responsibility soon came to characterize normative debates in areas far beyond
the political.388
It is not entirely clear why the rhetoric of personal responsibility
proved so popular. Historian Daniel Rodgers argues that it was a response to popular anxieties many were coming to feel during the period
about the existence, or at least thickness, of a national moral community.
The decline of the Fordist economy in the 1970s — which had provided
a great swath of the white working class prosperity and security389 —
and the increasing destabilization of social norms produced by the (partial) success of movements for racial and gender equality, Rodgers argues, produced an age of “fracture.”390 This was characterized by pervasive doubt about the existence of broadly shared moral norms, and
about the propriety of limiting individual freedom in the name of the
collective good. It was in this context, he claims, that the idea of moral
community morphed into “something smaller, more voluntaristic, fractured, easier to exit, and more guarded”391 and “conceptions of human
nature . . . thick with context, social circumstances, institutions, and history gave way to conceptions of human nature that stressed choice,
agency, performance, and desire.”392
Leading historical accounts of the period depict a process in which
the increasing prominence of the idea of personal responsibility in political rhetoric in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged the individualization
and the moralization of social problems. Poverty, for example, which
President Lyndon Johnson famously equated to a public health problem
that everyone owed a duty to eradicate,393 came instead to be represented as a moral problem — that is to say, as a product of the bad or
irresponsible choices of the poor.394 Proponents of welfare reform accordingly argued that limiting the availability of welfare would improve
the moral character of its recipients by encouraging self-reliance.395 Indeed, the significant reform, or more accurately slow strangulation, of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
387
388
389

MOUNK, supra note 384, at 35–37.
Id. at 37–64.
THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POSTWAR DETROIT 17–22, 92–95 (Princeton Classic ed. 2005).
390 RODGERS, supra note 384, at 3–11.
391 Id. at 220.
392 Id. at 3.
393 MOUNK, supra note 384, at 66 (“[O]ur . . . effort must pursue poverty, pursue it wherever it
exists . . . . Our aim is not only to relieve the symptom of poverty, but to cure it and, above all, to
prevent it.” (quoting Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS
112, 114 (Jan. 8, 1964)).
394 See RODGERS, supra note 384, at 201–09.
395 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 196 (2001) (noting that the same emphasis
on personal responsibility that has come to infuse criminal justice policy in the United States also
informed welfare reform); Nikolas Rose, Government and Control, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 321,
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social insurance against labor-market, health, and income shocks that
occurred during this period was propelled, and primarily justified, by
“the mantra of individual control and personal responsibility.”396
We see a parallel between these developments and the doctrinal arc
we have mapped so far: the Court’s embrace of apparent fault as a limiting principle in its criminal and constitutional remedies cases similarly
individualized, and moralized, questions of legal liability. To see this,
step back and consider first the early and mid-twentieth-century Court’s
approach to the crafting of liability rules.
A dominant theme in both the Court’s criminal and constitutional
remedies cases from this period was that legal sanctions could and
should be viewed instrumentally, as a means of deterring harmful acts
and encouraging good behavior. This instrumental approach to the
crafting of liability rules is evident, for example, in Shevlin-Carpenter’s
insistence that legislatures have broad power to “adjust legislation to
evils as they arise and to the ways by which they may be effected” by legal
interventions.397 It also explains the Court’s willingness in Dotterweich
and like cases to punish corporate officers who simply failed to take
adequate precautions against the risk that their subordinates might violate the law. The Court recognized that imposing punishment in such
cases would place a “burden” on those who did not necessarily intend to
break the law, but that it was nevertheless justified by the “interest of
the larger good.”398 It recognized, in other words, that the rights and
responsibilities of individuals could be adjusted to serve the “larger
good.” As a consequence, it assumed that differently positioned individuals might possess different legal obligations, not because of anything
they did, but by virtue of their social position — and specifically, the
power it gave them to do harm.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
334 (2000) (“[W]orkfare programmes in the Unites States and welfare reform in the United Kingdom
seek to micro-manage the behaviour of welfare recipients in order to remoralize them. . . . The aim,
once more, is responsibilization: to reconstruct self-reliance . . . .”). Hence, President Clinton’s primary welfare reform legislation was entitled the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
396 JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 37 (2006). It is important to emphasize that
the United States has been an outlier in comparison to its international peers in its longstanding
“predilection for the private sector and market processes” and its “reliance on market solutions”
rather than social ones. DAVID GARLAND, THE WELFARE STATE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 74 (2016).
397 Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69 (1910).
398 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943); see United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658, 672 (1975) (“Dotterweich and the cases which have followed reveal that in providing sanctions
which reach and touch the individuals who execute the corporate mission . . . the [Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic] Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when
they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations
will not occur.”).
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This assumption is explicit in the Dotterweich opinion. To explain
why Congress might have wanted to burden corporate officers like
Dotterweich with the risk of strict criminal liability, the Court pointed
to the significant power differential that existed between them and the
consumers who purchased their goods. Congress must have believed,
the Court explained, that it was better that hardship fall on corporate
officers “who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of
the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce” than on members of “the innocent public who are wholly helpless” to defend themselves against the harms
produced by the introduction into the stream of commerce of defective
goods.399 But this assumption is also evident in other criminal cases
from the period — for example, the decision in United States v. Balint400
construing the Anti-Narcotics Act to impose liability absent proof of
fault.401
In its constitutional cases, the Court evinced a similar approach to
the crafting of liability rules. Consider, for example, the landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona,402 which imposed on police officers what
the Court later recognized to be a “prophylactic [liability] rule[].”403 The
Court justified the decision to craft a prophylactic rule of police procedure on the grounds that doing so was necessary to ensure effective enforcement of the Fifth Amendment, given the tremendous power inequality that existed between police officers and criminal suspects in the
interrogation room.404 It was the “police-dominated atmosphere”405 of
the interrogation room, the Court made clear, and the risk of abuse and
coercion that it created, that required the enforcement of a broader liability rule than might otherwise apply.406
The Court’s embrace of fault as a limiting principle in both its criminal and constitutional remedies cases represents a marked shift away
from this instrumental and context-sensitive approach to the crafting of
liability rules. Indeed, what is striking about the apparent fault decisions is how little concern they evince for the downstream effects of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
399
400
401

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
258 U.S. 250 (1922).
Id. at 254 (concluding that, in crafting the law, “Congress weighed the possible injustice of
subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger
from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided” and asserting
that it was “[d]oubtless” that “consideration[] as to the opportunity of the seller to find out the fact”
of his law violation, when compared to the buyer’s opportunity to do so, “contributed to this conclusion”).
402 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
403 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
404 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58.
405 Id. at 456.
406 Id. at 445, 456; see also David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 190, 194 (1988) (arguing that Miranda represents the Court’s attempt to craft a liability rule
that “minimize[s] the sum of administrative costs and error costs”).
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making evidence of fault a prerequisite of either criminal liability or
constitutional remedy.
Consider, for example, the decision in Staples, which interpreted conviction under the National Firearms Act to require proof that the defendant knew the characteristics that rendered his weapon subject to
registration under the Act, not just that he possessed a “dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.”407 As
Justice Stevens noted in dissent, by requiring the prosecution to prove
specifically that the defendant knew, in this case, that the weapon was
capable of automatic fire, the Court deviated from the principle articulated in Dotterweich and other earlier opinions: namely, when individuals stand “in responsible relation to a public danger,”408 courts “have
assumed that . . . Congress intended to place the burden on [those individuals] to ‘ascertain at [their] peril whether [their conduct] comes
within the inhibition of the statute.’”409 It thus removed any incentive
owners of convertible semiautomatic machine guns might have had to
ensure their guns did not fall within the terms of the Act. And it did so
not because it found that the costs imposed by the lower courts’ interpretation of the statute on those who unknowingly possessed regulated
firearms outweighed the costs produced by the Court’s interpretation,
or that it was required by either the statutory text or legislative history.410 It did so because it found it “unthinkable . . . that Congress
intended to subject . . . law-abiding, well-intentioned citizens” to criminal liability under the Act.411 Rather than basing its interpretation of
the Firearms Act on a careful construction of its effects, or careful attention to what Congress intended, the Court relied upon an assumption
that Congress would not have wished to impose criminal punishment
on those who were not truly blameworthy.
In its constitutional remedies cases, the Court also moved away from
the instrumental, context-sensitive approach it employed in Miranda
and toward an approach that focused much more on the moral character
of the constitutional violator’s acts. The decision in United States v.
Leon is representative of the new approach. Recall that in that case, the
Court held that evidence unconstitutionally collected by police officers
acting in reasonable reliance on a defective warrant did not have to be
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
407
408

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994) (quoting trial transcript).
Id. at 630 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281
(1943)).
409 Id. at 634 (quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922)).
410 Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Stevens provided persuasive evidence that Congress did intend
to criminalize “innocent” possession. Id. at 625–28. Certainly, all but one of the lower courts to
interpret the statute had concluded as much. Id. at 636–37, 637 n.23 (citing the cases).
411 Id. at 615 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1254 (5th Cir.
1989)).
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excluded from trial.412 The Court claimed that its recognition of a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule was justified by a rational accounting of the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule in
cases involving reasonable police mistakes.413 In fact, the Court’s analysis of the costs of limiting the exclusionary rule to cases involving bad
faith violations of the Fourth Amendment was extremely thin. The
Leon Court asserted that allowing the inclusion of evidence gathered by
police officers who acted in reasonable reliance on defective warrants
would not result in appreciably greater numbers of Fourth Amendment
violations because officers would not act differently even if the evidence
they gathered was excluded from trial.414 This was because, the Court
asserted, “an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s
probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient.”415 In focusing solely on the question of
whether the individual officer could be expected to question, on his own
initiative, the magistrate’s actions, the Court entirely ignored the possibility that police departments might put in place policies and procedures
to prevent officers from relying on defective warrants, or to minimize
their issuance.416
The notion that liability rules can reduce the incidence of institutional wrongdoing by creating incentives for entities to identify new policy and procedures is hardly a novel one417 — yet neither Leon nor any
of its successor cases has even entertained the possibility. This suggests
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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413

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
Id. (“We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot
justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”).
414 Id. at 920 (“[E]xcluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any
appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reasonable officer
would and should act in similar circumstances.” (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539–40
(1976) (White, J., dissenting))).
415 Id. at 921.
416 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, “[i]f evidence is consistently excluded [when officers
rely upon defective warrants], police departments will surely be prompted to instruct their officers
to devote greater care and attention to providing sufficient information to establish probable cause
when applying for a warrant, and to review with some attention the form of the warrant that they
have been issued, rather than automatically assuming that whatever document the magistrate has
signed will necessarily comport with Fourth Amendment requirements.” Id. at 955 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
417 For an analysis of how courts can use “open-ended second-order decisions” that speak to
policymakers in order to “prevent arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement behavior,” see John
Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 218 (2015) (emphasis omitted). For a critique of Leon that accords with our own, see Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 608–09 (1985)
(“[A] close examination of the deployment of cost-benefit data by the majority in Leon reveals that
this whole attempt at empirical utilitarian analysis is something of a charade. . . . [T]he Court’s
decision rests on little but prior dispositions and unarticulated premises.”).
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that, notwithstanding the Court’s effort to justify Leon and similar decisions in cost-benefit terms, in fact what ultimately motivated the Court
in these cases was not a desire to maximize the public good of security
at minimal cost but instead a moral intuition: namely, that allowing
guilty defendants to go free due to the exclusion of evidence gathered
even “when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good
faith . . . offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.”418
More recent decisions, such as McDonnell and Heien, also pay almost no attention to questions of social context or institutional incentives. Instead, they focus intently on questions of individual “choice,
agency, . . . and desire.”419 Did the defendant official in McDonnell, for
example, choose to engage in behavior that he knew to be criminal in
nature? Were his desires those of a “conscientious public official[]”420 or
those of a lawbreaker? Similarly, did the police officer in Heien act
reasonably? These are the questions that dominate the Court’s analysis,
rather than questions about the costs and benefits of implementing one
or the other liability regime evaluated with a wide-angle lens that accounts for social and institutional context.
In short, decisions such as Staples, Leon, McDonnell, and Heien
showcase the Court’s turn away from an analysis grounded in careful
consideration of how to minimize social costs, and toward a narrower
focus on what is morally appropriate conduct, given social understandings of legality.421 This is not to say that any conception of the collective
good vanishes from the case law: the expansion of law enforcement discretion to investigate and question subjects under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments might be understood to be a means of serving the public
good — although there is good reason to doubt the empirics of this
claim.422 Nevertheless, when weighing the costs and benefits associated
with different liability regimes, the Court in these cases has tended to
find that the cost of imposing liability on the “apparently innocent” is a
cost that cannot be borne.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
418
419
420
421

Leon, 468 U.S. at 908.
RODGERS, supra note 384, at 3.
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016).
The term “moral” is an ambiguous and complex one. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS
AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 174–96 (1985). We use it in its most general sense, although
we concur with Professor Williams’s concern that morality is concerned only with “[a] focused,
particularized judgment. There is a pressure within it to require a voluntariness that will be total
and will cut through character and psychological or social determination . . . .” Id. at 194.
422 The idea that expanding police discretion will inevitably lead to improvements in crime control, for instance, is not necessarily true: police may adopt measures that impose asymmetric costs
on marginalized groups because of the belief that such groups are especially likely to be criminal.
The result of such policies, in the medium term, can be to reduce the efficacy of policing and exacerbate criminogenic conditions. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2398–401 (2017)
(developing an argument along these lines in respect to urban stop-and-frisk).
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The result is that a narrow focus on the individual object of judicial
regulation, and whether he or she in some sense deserves to be penalized
or blamed for a violation of the law, has come to eclipse consideration
of whether that person is best placed to mitigate potential costs. Hence,
in McDonnell, the Court did not consider whether elected politicians are
least cost avoiders in efforts to stymie improper influence on public action, whether any equally effective alternative regulatory strategies existed, or whether its very demanding interpretation of the actus reus
element of the federal anticorruption statute might have a systemic negative effect on the responsiveness of elected bodies to the general public.423 Similarly, in Heien, the majority entirely disregarded the likely
possibility that the ruling would only exacerbate the problem of discriminatory traffic stops.424
The consequence has been to produce a set of doctrinal rules that are
largely insensitive to differences in social power. Cases such as Dotterweich
and Shevlin-Carpenter take seriously the idea that concentrated social
power might warrant a greater measure of social responsibility. No such
sense is apparent in the Court’s more recent constitutional remedies or
criminal cases. By insisting on evidence of fault as a nonnegotiable prerequisite to criminal punishment or constitutional remedy, the Court has
equalized the obligations imposed on the powerful and the powerless.
The result is, in many cases, to obscure the external costs imposed by
the unlawful but apparently innocent actions of the powerful, while at
the same time requiring the powerless to live up to a demanding (and,
one might argue, overly burdensome) standard of responsibility.
We have characterized apparent fault as hinging on the Justices’
views about the social understanding of legality. Why doesn’t that lead
to an emphasis on social context more generally? The short answer is
that it could — but the particular way in which apparent fault is operationalized in practice has tended to exculpate those wielding social or
governmental power from more careful and responsible exercise of their
power, and it does not account better for the social context of powerful
actors’ decisions. Selective attention to social understandings of legality
is emphatically not the same as a nuanced judicial understanding of the
workings of power in the Weberian sense. In consequence, apparent
fault is not a means of socializing risk despite the fact that it hinges on
a social understanding of legally relevant acts: it is a way of denying the
means by which the costs of socially and governmentally privileged acts
are externalized.
Like the rhetoric of personal responsibility in the political sphere,
what the Court’s embrace of an apparent fault rule in its public law
cases does, in other words, is to moralize and in many respects decontextualize the analysis of legal rights and responsibilities. This suggests
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
423
424

See Eisler, supra note 26, at 1645–51.
See McAdams, supra note 165, at 195.
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that the same factors that led politicians of all stripes to embrace personal responsibility as a mantra may also be responsible for the change
in the Court’s approach to questions of criminal statutory interpretation
and constitutional remedies. It suggests, in other words, that what
Rodgers so aptly called “the fracture of the social”425 may not only capture the shape of important shifts in political discourse but also describe
a good deal of contemporary public law.
Conceptualizing the turn to apparent fault in the Court’s public law
jurisprudence not only as a product of internal jurisprudential changes
or external political changes, but also as a product of changes in the
dominant conception of the relationship between the state and its citizens, has further implications. It helps explain why a jurisprudential
rule that — as we have argued — tends to assign the cost of producing
social order in highly regressive ways has nevertheless enjoyed such
wide (and bipartisan) support among the Justices. It also points to continuities between the cases and the broader political and intellectual
landscape in which they occurred that have so far largely gone unobserved, both by historians and by doctrinal scholars. These continuities
suggest that the Court is unlikely to move away from its focus on apparent fault any time soon. Certainly in political discourse, the rhetoric
of personal responsibility continues to enjoy widespread support.426 If
the future is any replay of the past, the Court’s public law cases will,
similarly, continue to emphasize questions of agency, choice, and desire.
The ascendancy of apparent fault may not, in other words, be anywhere close to ending yet. To that end, this Article has attempted to
diagnose its causes, its characteristics, and its consequences. We have
not attempted to conclusively adjudicate its normative merits. Ultimately, normative judgment about the virtue of employing apparent
fault to limit the operation of state power will depend on the answers to
large and contestable questions about the meaning of culpability, the
desirable socialization of risk, and the relative importance of the structural and the individual in determining specific life patterns. We have
our own views on these larger questions. Nothing in our argument
stands or falls on whether a reader concurs with those views. But lest
there be doubt, it is our view that the demand for apparent fault we
have described imposes both static and dynamic burdens unwisely and
unfairly. We think its desiccated and isolated conception of the human
animal blinks inevitable and important forms of human interdependency, while cloaking that blindness in a moralizing and inequitable ar–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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got of responsibility and just deserts. We hence see scant reason to recommend apparent fault as a regulative principle — at least, not the version of fault employed in important strands of the Supreme Court’s public law case law.
Even if you disagree with this assessment, however, we think that
questions of coherence between doctrinal change and larger intellectual
trends — to date largely viewed as outside the bailiwick of doctrinal
scholars — will resonate. These questions challenge easy assumptions
about the autonomy and integrity of the law, the facile juxtaposition
between “political” branches and an “independent” judiciary. They consequently ought to be center stage as scholars try to grapple with constitutional law’s fraught and divisive function in an increasingly polarized, unequal, racially divided, and unstable nation.
CONCLUSION
This Article has traced a genealogy of apparent fault — partial, inconstant, and sometimes implicit — across different lines of Supreme
Court jurisprudence during the last thirty years. Our threshold aim has
been to demonstrate previously ignored commonalities that knit together
that jurisprudence. By attending not just to the instances in which
courts have insisted on evidence of fault but also to those instances in
which strict liability still obtains, we have sought to develop a deeper
account of how jurisprudential changes, in net, both reflect and potentially reinforce shifting distributions of state coercive power. The stakes
of even incremental shifts in this corner of constitutional doctrine, we
think, are more consequential than is generally appreciated. Further,
they cannot be understood in isolation from larger cultural and intellectual shifts. Indeed, our final contribution is an account of the historical
and intellectual context in which fault triumphed.
American constitutional doctrine should not be understood in isolation from its historical and intellectual context. Nor should its incremental doctrinal components be isolated from one another and treated
as discrete specimens. The law may not work itself pure — as if such
an end state were even possible for an institution so deeply imbricated
in its social, political, and intellectual context — but viewing it synoptically makes it easier to comprehend the currents that shape its course,
their motive springs, and their repercussions, both proximate and distal.
Only once that perspective is in hand can a sound normative judgment
about our fractured, fracturing, and fault-dependent jurisprudential
landscape be sensibly reached.

